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Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global
Intellectual Property Regime
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG
Since the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994, the innovative landscape has undergone
dramatic changes due to technological advances in fields such as biotechnology,
nanotechnology, and digital communications and computation. The increasing
potential for user innovation, and open and collaborative innovation has brought
an explosion of innovative activity that does not fit into the sales-oriented, mass
market model which underlies the global intellectual property regime. In this
Article, I argue that the debate over global governance of innovation should be
expanded to account more fully for the implications of these changes. For the
most part, criticisms of TRIPS have focused on its failure to account adequately
for current needs for access to the fruits of innovative activity. In particular,
critics have focused on the agreement's failure to balance urgent public health
needs appropriately against the marginal boost to pharmaceutical innovation
supplied by patent protection in developing countries. Here I take a different
(though complementary) tack, focusing on the ways in which TRIPS and related
agreements enshrine an unduly narrow approach to innovation itself. An
adequate global governance system for innovation must take account of the
diversity and dynamism of modes of innovation. I propose a re-imagining of the
World Intellectual Property Organization as a broader-based innovation policy
organization and a global administrative law approach to accommodate evolving
modes of innovation.
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Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global
Intellectual Property Regime
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994,1 the innovative landscape has
undergone dramatic changes due to technological advances in fields such
as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and digital communications and
computation. Notably, the negotiation of TRIPS coincided almost exactly
with the rise in importance of the Internet following the invention of the
World Wide Web and the introduction of the Mosaic web browser in the
early 1990s.2 These technological changes have spawned major social
changes, which are increasingly felt throughout the world. The resulting
changes in the innovative landscape, especially as instantiated in the
complex technologies of the information technology industry, have given
rise to controversy about the proper contours of intellectual property (IP)
protection and to upheaval in the political economy of IP lawmaking. This
upheaval is reflected in the split between the pharmaceutical sector and
many information technology companies in their positions on patent
reform in the United States.3
Since 1994, there has been explosive growth in user innovation4 and

∗
Professor of Law, DePaul University. I thank Steve Charnovitz, Margaret Chon, Kevin Davis,
Graeme Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Ruth Okediji, participants at the NYU-Cape Town Global
Administrative Law Workshop, 2008 IP Scholars Conference, faculty workshops at George
Washington University, University of Minnesota, and Fordham University for invaluable comments
and Hima Lawrence for excellent research assistance. A brief report of some of this work will appear
in Acta Juridica (2008) as part of the proceedings of the NYU-Cape Town Global Administrative Law
Workshop. This Article was written in part while the Author was visiting at New York University
School of Law in 2007-08.
1
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 27 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the adoption and implementation of
the agreement).
2
See, e.g., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., AMERICA’S INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE 13 (2000), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/nsf0050/internet/mosaic.htm.
3
See Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 322 (2005) (discussing the disagreement between the pharmaceutical sector
and information technology companies regarding the Patent Reform Act of 2005).
4
For an overview of user innovation, see ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1–3
(2006).
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innovation resulting from open and collaborative processes.
These
innovation paradigms do not fit into the sales-oriented, mass market model
underlying IP doctrine. While these innovative paradigms are not new, the
ascendance of industrial research and development and of mass production
had pushed them to the margins. Technological advances, particularly in
digital communications, have revitalized these contexts for innovation in
surprising ways.
There has been considerable scholarly and public debate about the
impact of the TRIPS minimum standards approach to patent law on access
to patented technology, particularly in the public-health-related fields of
Indeed that debate has led to
pharmaceuticals and agriculture.6
modifications of the TRIPS agreement, as reflected in the Doha
Declarations,7 and to the adoption of a Development Agenda by the World
IP Organization (WIPO).8 Critics have also argued that the overly
cramped interpretations of TRIPS exceptions evident in the handful of
relevant World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution decisions
distort the balance between initial and follow-on innovation under a mass
market seller-based innovation regime.9 There has been considerably less
discussion, however, about the interplay between the global IP regime and
5
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1–2 (2006) (discussing the economic importance of open and collaborative
innovation).
6
See generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2821 (2006); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004); Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of
Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505 (2005); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 369 (2006); see also Thomas W. Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research
Program, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 182 (2005) (discussing the impact of TRIPS on biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals); Symposium, Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Accommodating and
Reconciling Different National Levels of Protection, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109 (2007) (collecting
articles discussing the impact of intellectual property agreements on public health and agriculture);
Symposium, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 239 (2003) (collecting articles discussing the impacts of intellectual property
agreements on indigenous cultures, plants, and medicines).
7
See World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001,
41 I.L.M. 746, 748–49 (2002); World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial 2001: Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 755, 755–56 (2002).
8
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE 45 ADOPTED RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER THE WIPO
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2007) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT AGENDA], available at http://www.wipo.
int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf .
9
For a discussion of recommended interpretations, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science
Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER
GLOBALIZED IP REGIME (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW (Lucie
Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without
Discriminating]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95 (2004).
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the revitalized practices of user innovation and open and collaborative
innovation.10
In this Article, I argue that, over and above previously appreciated
problems regarding access and the traditional IP balance, the trouble with
TRIPS—and with the global IP law regime more generally—is that it is illdesigned to cope with changes in the innovative process itself and with the
likely heterogeneity of desirable innovation approaches in different global
contexts. While current TRIPS flexibilities might be interpreted in ways
that will better balance the needs of initial innovators against those of users
and follow-on innovators, the very structure of the agreement is based on
an assumption of mass market, seller-based innovation which may make it
difficult to accommodate newer innovation paradigms.
Because the processes by which innovation occurs are various and
changing, it is important, but not sufficient, to focus on making substantive
improvements to TRIPS and its interpretations so as to deal with current
issues involving such things as access to medicines or agricultural
technologies and the increasing importance of information technology with
its predominance of cumulative innovation. The experience of the past
fifteen years should serve as a cautionary tale regarding the wisdom of
enshrining substantive rules based on any particular paradigm of
innovation in an inflexible international instrument. Thus, along with
seeking solutions to the particular problems confronting today’s innovators
in dealing with the outmoded TRIPS framework, it would be wise to
consider how to implement an ongoing process at the global level for
navigating the tension between the truly global reach of innovation and the
heterogeneous and changing social practice of innovation. The complexity
of the innovative environment, in combination with the need for both
flexibility and consistency, suggests that we consider an administrativetype approach which builds in an expectation of the need for substantive
updating of the global innovation policy governance regime, rather than an
attempt to lock in substantive standards tailored to today’s innovation
environment.11
10

But see Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual Property Organization and
the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Council in Regulating Intellectual Property
Rights in the Information Age, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 578, 578, 585 (1999) (discussing the need
for global IP regulation to account for unfolding technological change).
11
For general discussions of the varieties of and issues raised by “agency-like” actors at the
global level, see generally Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005);
Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State];
Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Global Standards]; Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Benedict Kingsbury
et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); AnneMarie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
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To that end, I propose a re-envisioning of WIPO as a more broadly
conceived innovation policy organization, which would serve as a center of
discourse not only about how IP law per se should be adapted to changing
modes of innovation but also about how to confront new dilemmas raised
by evolving innovative practices, which may involve issues beyond IP law,
such as competition policy, licensing practices, and the tradeoff between
private ordering and the public domain.12 WIPO has historically focused
on promoting the IP regime13 and has been rightly criticized for pursuing
the stronger IP rights myopically.14 (Indeed, WIPO has manifested some
hostility toward the poster child for open and collaborative innovation:
open source software).15 Nonetheless, I argue—building on a related
argument by Rochelle Dreyfuss16—that WIPO is the most promising home
for a broader focus on innovation policy in light of its expertise, its
experience with the Development Agenda, and its relationship with the
WTO under TRIPS. Indeed, there are encouraging signs in this regard in
SCI. 211 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative
Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005).
12
For general discussions regarding the challenges to the balance between IP and the public
domain raised by private ordering, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property
System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA
(Daniel S. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, The International IP System: Treaties, Norms,
National Courts, and Private Ordering]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of
International Copyright Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 161, 162 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Private Ordering], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=604161; Séverine Dusollier Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through
Private Ordering, 82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1391 (2007); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do:
The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005);
Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
25 (2000); Arti K. Rai, “Open Source” and Private Ordering: A Commentary on Dusollier, 82 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 1439 (2007).
13
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1749, 1772 (“The objectives of the Organization are: (i) to promote the protection of intellectual
property throughout the world through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in
collaboration with any other international organization, (ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among
the Unions.”). See generally Debora J. Halbert, The World Intellectual Property Organization: Past,
Present and Future, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 253 (2006), for a discussion of the history of
WIPO and its goals, along with a critique of WIPO governance and a proposal that it take on a broader,
more participatory role in the development context.
14
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual
Property Norms, 39 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK INT’L L. (forthcoming 2008), draft at 37 (“In sum,
WIPO’s institutional transformation and the strategies by which that transformation was effected . . .
were central in entrenching the contemporary prevailing IP orthodoxy in which public policy concerns
can limit the exclusive proprietary rights of rights owner only in exceptional circumstances.”)
15
See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, The Quiet War Over Open-Source, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003 at
E01, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (describing WIPO capitulation to pressure to
cancel a meeting to discuss open source software).
16
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Fostering Dynamic Innovation and Development: International IP as a
Case Study in Global Administrative Law, ACTA JURIDICA (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2008.4Dreyfuss.pdf. For a similar argument with respect to
development issues, see also Halbert, supra note 13, at 283–84.
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recent WIPO recognition of the impingement of broader innovation policy
issues on the patent system.17 The thrust of this Article is to encourage a
more central place for considerations of the full panoply of innovation
paradigms in the development of patent policy and of IP more generally.
A broader mandate for WIPO could be implemented in several ways,
with varying levels of administrative discretion vested in the re-imagined
organization.18 As a first cut, WIPO might develop an Innovation Policy
Agenda incorporating the concerns of innovative communities of various
types, including commercial firms, user innovator communities, scientific
researchers, and open source proponents, along with the concerns of other
stakeholders such as developing and developed countries and NGOs
representing users. An Innovation Policy Agenda would be distinct from
the Development Agenda because it would focus on the effects of evolving
innovation paradigms, which cut across countries at every level of
development. Nonetheless, it would benefit from WIPO’s experience with
the Development Agenda, which has already taken a peripheral interest in
some aspects of open and collaborative innovation and in preservation of
the public domain.19 One of the tasks involved in proposing an Innovation
Policy Agenda must be to reconsider current WIPO projects in light of a
broader view of the global innovation regime. In particular, WIPO should
reconsider its attempt to develop a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT)
in light of a broader innovation mandate, just as it has been urged to do
with respect to development and access issues.20
Rochelle Dreyfuss has considered in detail various legal mechanisms
by which the WTO might incorporate WIPO input in interpreting TRIPS
flexibilities under Articles 27, 30, and 31 in light of the Policies and
17
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 2 (Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_3.pdf; WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF
PATENTS, SUMMARY BY THE CHAIR, annex (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.wipo.
int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_4_rev.pdf. The standing Committee on the Law of Patents
(SCLP) has long been stymied in its efforts to devise a Substantive Patent Law Treaty by a divide
between developed countries favoring strong protection and less developed countries concerned with
facilitating access. As discussed below in more detail, infra nn. 241–43 and accompanying text,
changing innovation practices may shake up the familiar alliances.
18
See Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 48–52 (discussing potential models for the WIPO-WTO
relationship).
19
See DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 8, at paras. 16, 17, 23, 27, 35, 36, 45 (recommending
policies to facilitate innovation and openness in intellectual property systems).
20
See Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus:
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 90–92 (2007)
(arguing that the proposed SLPT would negatively impact both developing and developed countries);
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PROPOSAL BY ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR WIPO, annex at 2–3 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31
_11.pdf (suggesting that new intellectual property protections under the SLPT would obstruct access to
information).

868

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:861

21

Objectives set out in Articles 7 and 8. As part of an Innovation Policy
Agenda, WIPO should consider proposed implementations of TRIPS
flexibilities from an innovation policy perspective. Its deliberation
procedures should be designed—in analogy to notice and comment
proceedings in domestic administrative law—to provide transparency and
participation22 sufficient to endow the results with persuasive weight in the
deliberations of WTO dispute resolution panels and the TRIPS Council.23
Alternatively, as also discussed by Dreyfuss, the formal role of WIPO in
interpreting TRIPS could be expanded either by amending TRIPS to
provide for deference to WIPO interpretations or by expanding the joint
activities of WIPO and the TRIPS Council as a means of incorporating
WIPO views indirectly through the TRIPS Council.24
These suggestions for implementing a broader-based innovation policy
are constrained, of course, by the language of TRIPS itself. While there is
arguably considerable leeway in TRIPS, its provisions, which prohibit
technological “discrimination,”25 mandate a case-by-case approach to
compulsory licensing,26 assume that all exceptions to strong patent rights
should be “limited,”27 and require that all patentees be afforded exclusive
rights of use,28 were not designed with user innovation, or open and
collaborative innovation in mind. In the end, these provisions may not
stretch far enough to accommodate newer innovative paradigms in an
optimal manner.
An even more ambitious approach to WIPO involvement would be to
amend TRIPS to provide a more open-ended exception provision which
would accommodate evolving innovation practices by providing a more
explicit role for WIPO in vetting potential exceptions in light of innovation
policy. For example, one might imagine replacing Article 30 with a broad
provision permitting exceptions that are “reasonably calculated to promote
innovation and not to restrain trade” and explicitly providing that Articles
21

Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 25–33.
For discussions of issues of accountability, transparency, and participation in global governance
see, for example, Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra note 11, at 690–91; Esty, supra
note 11, at 1527–37; Kingsbury et al., supra note 11, at 37–40; Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 11, at
220–24.
23
Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 22, 42, discusses the way in which WIPO and its predecessors
have employed publications and studies to play a key role in shaping the substantive debate about the
contours of IP protection in the past.
24
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26–31. See also Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 49–50, discussing a
possible role for WIPO as an “expert agency,” though concluding that it would be preferable for the
WTO to be the primary setter of global IP norms. Id. at 54–58. WIPO’s structure and procedures
would have to be re-tooled in order for WIPO to play this type of formal vetting role. I float the
possibility here, but leave detailed discussion of how WIPO would be organized to play this role for
another day.
25
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.
26
Id. art. 31.
27
Id. art. 30.
28
Id. art. 28.
22
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27 and 28 are subject to such exceptions. WIPO evaluations of the
reasonableness of particular exceptions as a matter of innovation policy
could then be afforded a degree of deference. Such an approach would be
desirable only if WIPO’s vetting procedures met minimal standards of
transparency and accountability, of course, and there is room for debate as
to the proper degree of deference that should be afforded to WIPO
determinations.29
Finally, a re-tooled WIPO would also provide a forum for discourse
and possible standard-setting regarding issues specifically raised by new
modes of innovation that are not covered by TRIPS with its mass market,
seller-based focus. In particular, an innovation policy organization would
provide a forum for debate about appropriate licensing forms for open and
collaborative innovation projects; standards for competition policy in
relation to such collaborative projects, including, for example, patent
pools; issues of exhaustion and of repair and reconstruction, which are of
relevance for user innovation; and proposals for navigating the boundaries
between collaborative projects and proprietary inventions on the one hand
and the public domain on the other.
There are a number of private organizations currently involved in
global standard-setting for open and collaborative projects.30 A global
innovation policy organization could learn much from such organizations,
some of which have adopted rulemaking procedures strikingly similar to
those required under domestic administrative law regimes.31 Perhaps such
organizations should simply be left to their own devices. However, if the
collaborative limited commons paradigm is emulated more broadly, it
might be appropriate to consider some limitations or standards to govern
the extent to which commons arrangements should be permitted to fence
off the public domain through private, albeit distributed, ordering.32 In any
event, the point here is not to answer, or even to pose, all of the substantive
questions that would fall within the purview of an international innovation
policy organization, but only to query whether the global governance of
innovation would benefit from a more flexible, broadly-based center of
innovation expertise. Encouragingly, the WIPO Standing Committee on
29

See Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26–27 (discussing “the legitimacy of relying on standard
generated by WIPO” in interpreting TRIPS).
30
E.g., Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); Free
Software Foundation, www.fsf.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); Open Source Initiative,
www.opensource.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); CAMBIA’s BiOS (Biological Open Source)
Initiative, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); Patent
Commons Project, www.patentcommons.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
31
For example, the Free Software Foundation uses a highly structured online public comment
procedure for reviewing drafts of its licenses. Free Software Foundation, http://gplv3.fsf.org/ (last
visited Oct. 12, 2008).
32
For articles that discuss the limitations of private ordering, see Dinwoodie, Private Ordering,
supra note 12, at 168; Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1434–35; Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 407–20;
Rai, supra note 12, at 1440–42.
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Patents has recently shown an inclination to consider some of these
broader innovation policy questions.33 The proposal here would be to shift
the focus of WIPO’s portfolio to put innovation policy front and center,
regarding IP as only one mechanism for innovation, rather than focusing
on IP, with merely a secondary concern for innovation policy more
generally.
In pursuing any of these objectives, it will be important to consider
how to provide transparency and accountability. Here, WIPO’s experience
with the Development Agenda should be instructive.34 Because innovative
paradigms cross national boundaries and may bring together developing
and developed country inventors, it will be important to allow for the
participation of a variety of stakeholders in the discourse, including
countries, NGOs, user innovators, open and collaborative innovation
groups, and the commercial sector. The Internet itself opens up more
expansive possibilities for voice even beyond increased participation by
recognized groups—a global online version of notice and comment is a
practical possibility that would permit the development of innovation
policy itself to tap into the same emergent and heterogeneous expertise that
drives some of these newer innovation paradigms.35
In Part II, I begin by describing the emerging paradigms of user
innovation and open and collaborative innovation and go on to explore
some of their relevant features. In Part III, I discuss the shortcomings of
the current TRIPS-based regime as a means of promoting global
innovation, arguing that the trade paradigm underlying TRIPS distorts
innovation policy and discussing how current TRIPS provisions may
33

See REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 16, at 35–38 (discussing
open technology standards and collaborative research projects such as open source software, the
proposal for a medical research and development treaty, and public-private research projects);
SUMMARY BY THE CHAIR, supra note 16, at 2 & Annex (reiterating the issues discussed in the Report
on the International Patent System, agreeing to further discuss their significance, and establishing
preliminary studies on several issues).
34
See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 13, at 272–76 (describing the opening up of WIPO to broader
participation during the period leading up to its adoption of the Development Agenda).
35
For related ideas to promote online participation in governance, see, for example, Cynthia M.
Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent Policies,
39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433, 532–40 (2006) (proposing that WIPO host an online forum for
commentary and debate about potential biopiracy and other moral and policy issues raised by particular
patents); Steven Charnovitz, Economic and Social Actors in the World Trade Organization, 7 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 259, 274 (2001); Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence,
Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 143 (2006) (proposing the peer-topatent review process); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY
L.J. 433, 433–38 (2004) (discussing the potential, generally, for online public participation in noticeand-comment rulemaking in the United States domestic context); http://gplv3.fsf.org (showing the
discussion process used by the Free Software Foundation in developing its GPL licenses);
www.peertopatent.org (discussing an experimental project inviting online review of patent applications
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office). See also Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade
Organization in 2020, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L RELATIONS 167, 182–88 (2005) (arguing for broader
participation and greater transparency in the WTO generally).
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impede the full realization of the potential of these newer innovation
modes. Part IV discusses the proposal for re-imagining WIPO. Part V
concludes.
II. THE (RE)-EMERGENCE OF USER INNOVATION AND OPEN AND
COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION
The twenty-first century has seen an explosion in user innovation and
in open and collaborative innovative activity. These modes of innovation
have very different characteristics from the mass market seller-based
innovation which was the model for TRIPS.36 They are simultaneously
more global and more local than the mass market paradigm. They rely
much less than the traditional paradigm on IP for incentives to invent,
disclose, and disseminate,37 make use of sticky information which is
distributed heterogeneously in the population and of diverse experiences
and knowledge,38 and often are heavily reliant on ongoing contractual or
social ordering rather than on isolated arms-length transactions.39
While these practices are unlikely to replace the mass market sellerbased innovation paradigm wholesale, they already pose a serious
challenge to that paradigm in some arenas—particularly in the production
36
See BENKLER, supra note 4, at 1–2, 35–40 (discussing traditional commercial models and the
emergence of non-commercial models of information sharing); VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 1–5;
supra text accompanying note 4–5.
37
See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 1, 5 (2004) (discussing the nonproprietary
nature of open source code); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369, 423–40 (2002) (discussing effective peer production, diverse motivations, and the
commons and incentives problems); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for
Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 483–90 (discussing implications of user innovation for
patent doctrine); Dietmar Harhoff et al., Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users
Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations, 32 RES. POL’Y 1753–54 (2003), available at
http://userinnovation.mit.edu/papers/3.pdf (discussing “free revealing” of proprietary information and
its incentives, explanations, and effects); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source
Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 20, 21–22 (2005); Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers
Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, in
PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 3, 3 (J. Feller, B. Fitzgerald, S. Hissam, K. R.
Lakhani eds., 2005), available at http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Sloan-School-of-Management/15352Spring-2005/D2C127A9-B712-4ACD-AA82-C57DE2844B8B/0/lakhaniwolf.pdf.
38
See BENKLER, supra note 5, at 408–12; VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 8–9; Christian Luthje,
Cornelius Herstatt & Eric von Hippel, User-Innovators and “Local” Information: The Case of
Mountain Biking, 34 RES. POL’Y 951, 951–52, 962–63 (2005) (discussing users’ tendency to use “local
information”); Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the Private-Collective
Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. SCI. 209, 210–13 (2003); Eric von Hippel,
“Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI.
429, 429–32 (1994) (discussing the impact of information stickiness on innovation).
39
See supra note 12; see also Arti Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for
Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES 131–34 (Robert W. Hahn,
ed. 2005); Nikolaus Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative Activities: An
Exploration of Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES. POL’Y 157, 157–58 (2003); Sapna
Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1747–
48 (2007) (discussing the legal challenges posed in devising an open innovation model for synthetic
biology).
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40

of platform information technology —and are likely to increase in
importance over time. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that these
relatively recent developments represent the end of evolution of global
innovation practice. Instead, recent history suggests that we would be wise
to “expect the unexpected” and anticipate an evolving innovation policy
regime.
A. User Innovation
Cyclists interested in off-road cycling invent the original mountain
bikes.41 Steel manufacturers develop improvements on the Bessemer steel
process that lead to an eight-fold increase in production in a ten-year
period.42 Users of printed circuit computer-aided design software modify
and develop the software to accommodate increasingly densely-packed
circuit boards.43 Surgeons improve and modify medical equipment for
their own use.44 Builders develop means for routing wiring through
commercially available “stressed-skin panels” used to form the outer walls
of houses.45 An operator of an online store develops a method of
streamlining the payment process for frequent customers.46 A research
scientist develops a new instrument for measuring the chemical
composition of a surface.47
The above are all examples of user innovation. In earlier studies, Eric
von Hippel and others demonstrated that “users of products and services—
both firms and individual consumers—are increasingly able to innovate for
themselves” in many fields of technology.48 Several recent developments
exemplify the increasing relevance of user innovation to the traditional IP
regime. For example, open source software is significantly driven by user
40
See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37, at 94–108 (discussing the evolution and growth of the Unixbased operating system, Linux).
41
See Guido Buenstorf, Designing Clunkers: Demand-Side Innovation and the Early History of
Mountain Bikes, in CHANGE, TRANSFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT 54, 61 (John Stan Metcalfe &
Uwe Cantner eds., 2003).
42
Peter B. Meyer, Episodes of Collective Invention 7 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Working Paper No. 368), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=466880.
43
Glen L. Urban & Eric von Hippel, Lead User Analyses for the Development of New Industrial
Products, 34 MGMT. SCI. 569, 571–73 (1988).
44
Christian Lüthje, Customers as Co-Inventors: An Empirical Analysis of the Antecedents of
Customer-Driven Innovations in the Field of Medical Equipment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 32ND
EMAC CONFERENCE (2003) (on file with author).
45
Sarah Slaughter, Innovation and Learning during Implementation: A Comparison of User and
Manufacturer Innovations, 22 RES. POL’Y 81, 83–88 (1993).
46
See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Injunction against Barnesandnoble.com is Overturned, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2001, at C3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYTFile (discussing patent dispute between
Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble over “One-Click” ordering method).
47
William Riggs & Eric von Hippel, Incentives to Innovate and the Sources of Innovation: The
Case of Scientific Instruments, 23 RES. POL’Y 459, 460–63 (1994).
48
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 1.
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innovation. Besides providing products with mass appeal, such as Linux,
the open source process provides a means to pool inventive resources to
obtain customized software products to suit the needs of dispersed and
relatively small groups of users.50 The expanding patentability of the tools
and products of agriculture, such as genetically modified seeds, brings
agricultural firms into conflict with farmers who have a long tradition of
innovation for their own use.51 The extension of patentable subject matter
to encompass business methods in the United States has been met with
skepticism.52 Underlying this skepticism may be an implicit recognition
49
See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 87; Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 34, at 3, 6–7
(discussing users’ motivations for working on open source software); James E. Bessen, Open Source
Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods 1–3 (B.U. Sch. of L., Working Paper, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=588763 (stating that free/open source software is a complement to
proprietary development by extending the market).
50
Open source software projects are extremely diverse in their participation rates. There is also
great diversity in the nature of participation—from proposing to administering to developing to merely
commenting on projects. A 2002 empirical study of open source projects on www.sourceforge.net,
probably the most popular platform for open source development, showed that the mean number of
developers for one hundred mature projects studied was about six. Sandeep Krishnamurthy, Cave or
Community? An Empirical Examination of 100 Mature Open Source Projects, FIRST MONDAY, 2002,
http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_6/krishnamurthy/.
51
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 247–52 (2003); David R. Downes, The Convention on Biological
Diversity: Seeds of Green Trade?, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 168 (1994); Ho, supra note 35, at 455–59
(discussing the conflict between patents, genetic resources, and traditional knowledge in developing
countries); Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1917, 1917–18, 1920–21, 1926–28 (2007) (discussing the patenting of genetic material in developing
countries); Haley Stein, Note, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States,
Trade, and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 161–64 (2005) (discussing
seed modification and commodification and its implications).
52
See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and BusinessMethod Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 833–36 (2003) (arguing that patents on business
methods are a monopolization of a line of business); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method
Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 267 (2000)
(discussing the negatives of allowing patents of software-embodied business methods); Alan L.
Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1495 (1999) (similarly
arguing that software-embodied business method patents should not be patentable subject matter); Julia
Alpert Gladstone, Why Patenting Information Technology and Business Methods Is Not Sound Policy:
Lessons from History and Prophecies for the Future, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 218–19 (2002)
(arguing that patenting internet business methods stifles innovation and rewards existing monopolies);
Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of Proprietarian
Norms—The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 321–25 (2005); Keith E. Maskus &
Eina Vivian Wong, Searching for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents, 8 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 289, 290–93 (2002); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 580–
81 (1999); Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
309, 309–11 (2002) (arguing that the death of the business method exception will lead to a patent
flood); Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense,
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61,
61–62 (2002); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139,1141–
43 (1999). See also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of cert as improvidently granted); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (raising questions about business
methods patents and the Federal Circuit’s standard for patentable subject matter); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479, *154–*194 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting). But
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that intent to use rather than sell has traditionally motivated the invention
of business methods.53 Scientific researchers are also user innovators,
inventing research tools and methods in the course of their research.54
Nevertheless, universities are increasingly (and controversially) patenting
scientific research tools.55
While user innovation has no doubt always been widespread, its
significance is growing because of technological changes since the
negotiation of TRIPS in 1994. The growing importance of software, as
both a tool of innovation and a component of products, means that more
and more design and experimentation is feasible with relatively limited
capital expenditure.56 Computerization of manufacturing and design also
decreases the cost of creating custom-designed products.57 The Internet
also enhances the potential for user innovation by providing mechanisms
by which medium-sized groups of users with similar needs for
customization can pool their inventive resources, thereby widening the
range of cost-effective user innovations.
User innovation is of greatest importance where users have both
unique local information about their needs and the technical capacity to
make inventions that fulfill those needs. The comparative advantage of
user innovation for a particular technology depends on factors such as the
heterogeneity of uses, the presence of lead users, the technical difficulty of
invention in a particular field, and the costs of development.58 For present
purposes, its most important features are its de-emphasis on the “incentive
to invent” justification for IP, its reliance on heterogeneous experience and
see, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 987, 1081–83 (2003) (arguing that business method patents are indistinguishable from other
patents on processes).
53
For a more extensive discussion of this case, see Katherine J. Strandburg, What If There Were a
Business Method Use Exemption to Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV 245, 248 (2008).
54
See Riggs & von Hippel, supra note 47; Strandburg, supra note 37, at 459.
55
See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The
Delicate Balance Between Current and Future Technical Progress, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH 107–08 (Peter Yu ed., 2006) (reviewing the longstanding debate over whether
there should be an exemption to patent infringement for research use); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1726 (1996) (positing that the patenting of upstream research tools
calls into question the appropriateness of public funding to support that research).
56
See BENKLER, supra note 5, at 68–75 (giving examples of peer production); id. at 212–33, 277–
78 (discussing the cost of communication, examples of dissemination of information through networkbased media, and the greater participatory role of individuals using networked media in fostering
discourse and formulating culture); VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 177 (“[T]here is a general trend
toward an open and distributed innovation process driven by steadily better and cheaper computing and
communications.”).
57
Stefan Thomke & Eric von Hippel, Customers as Innovators: A New Way to Create Value,
HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2002, at 74, 74–79.
58
See VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 70–76 (discussing circumstances under which users are lowcost innovators); Joachim Henkel & Eric von Hippel, Welfare Implications of User Innovation, 30 J.
TECH. TRANSFER 73, 73–74 (2005) (discussing in detail the welfare implications of user innovation in
comparison and relationship to manufacturer innovation).
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on tailoring innovation to specific uses (which undercuts the international
trade conception of commodity knowledge goods) and its recursive nature,
which heightens the importance of questions of control and private
ordering between users and manufacturers.
1. User Innovation and the IP Incentive Story
In sharp contrast to the standard seller-based view underlying most
discussions of the societal justifications for the patent system, user
innovators expect to benefit primarily from developing and using an
innovation rather than selling it.59 User innovators may also derive nonpecuniary returns from innovation, such as enjoyment of the process of
improving products for their own use, reputational status within a user
community, or opportunities to gain skills.60 Patents thus play a relatively
minor role in motivating them to invent.61 Besides motivating invention,
patenting should also motivate disclosure and dissemination of inventions.
Elsewhere, I have discussed in detail the ways in which patenting affects
incentives to disseminate and disclose user innovations, concluding that on
balance patent incentives tend to be much less important for user
innovations than for seller innovations.62 In part this is because a rather
surprising amount of “free revealing” of user innovations takes place.63
Presumably, this is because free revealing has significant reputational,
reciprocal, and other benefits to user innovators.64 This is partly because
users often form innovative communities in which they exchange ideas in a
collaborative fashion to the mutual advantage of group members.65 Free
revealing may enable others to improve on a user innovation, thus making
that innovation more valuable to the original user innovator.66 Free
59
For discussions of the traditional incentive theories of patenting, see, for example, Roger D.
Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 78–80 (2001);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 90–93 (2004).
60
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 85–88.
61
Strandburg, supra note 37, at 483–85.
62
Id. at 483–87.
63
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 77–80; see also Joachim Henkel, Selective Revealing in Open
Innovation Processes: The Case of Embedded Linux, 35 RES. POL’Y 953, 955, 960–62 (2006) (noting
various industries in which free revealing takes place and explaining its utility).
64
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 77–80; Harhoff et al., supra note 37, at 1756; Eric von Hippel &
Georg von Krogh, Free Revealing and the Private-Collective Model for Innovation Incentives, 36 R&D
MGMT. 295, 297–301, 304 (2006).
65
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 93–94; Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of
Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF IP (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss et al., eds. forthcoming 2009) (discussing sharing of research tools among scientists); Franke
& Shah, supra note 39, at 158–60, 164, 174; Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community
Norms at the Boundary between Academic and Industry Research, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming
2009) [hereinafter Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms] (discussing and modeling sharing in
user innovator communities).
66
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
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revealing occurs even between competitors, who sometimes prefer to share
certain kinds of information freely while competing in other ways.67
In general, then, patent protection is both less necessary and more
socially costly for user innovations than for seller innovations.
2. User Innovation and Heterogeneous and Local Knowledge
User innovation is also mismatched with the mass market seller-based
innovation paradigm because it is heterogeneous and relies on distributed
local knowledge. Users develop innovations that respond to their specific
needs and situations, leveraging their information advantages rather than
Many user
manufacturers’ advantages in large-scale production.68
innovators are lead users who develop their innovations by customizing or
modifying commercial products to satisfy their specific needs,69 often
anticipating features for which general consumer demand has not yet
developed.70 A study of innovations in mountain biking equipment, for
example, found that user innovations often depended on dispersed, local
information reflecting the inventors’ cycling experiences, unique
circumstances, and interests, such as a desire to bike in extreme weather
conditions or to perform acrobatic stunts.71 Transferring this experiential
knowledge to manufacturers can be expensive, making user innovation
more efficient, in many cases, than attempting to teach manufacturers what
diverse users want.72
Particularly in the international context, user innovation may be
necessary in order for a technology developed in one environment to be
useful in another.73 It may be extremely difficult for a manufacturer to
acquire the local experiential knowledge needed to customize a technology
for its best use in circumstances different from those for which it was
67
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 10, 87–88; Harhoff et al., supra note 37, at 1753, 1756; Henkel,
supra note 63, at 954; Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms, supra note 65.
68
Sonali K. Shah, Open Beyond Software, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0: THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION
339, 341–43 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Shah, Open Beyond Software]; Sonali K.
Shah, From Innovation to Firm Formation in the Windsurfing, Skateboarding, and Snowboarding
Industries 32–33 (Univ. of Ill., Working Paper No. 05-0107, 2006) [hereinafter Shah, From Innovation
to Firm Foundation], available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/
1/8/4/9/9/p184994_index.html (hyperlink “From Innovation to Firm Formation in the Windsurfing,
Skateboarding, and Snowboarding Industries”, then hyperlink “Application PDF”); VON HIPPEL, supra
note 4, at 45–46, 49.
69
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 22–24.
70
Id. at 22.
71
Id. at 72–73.
72
See Henkel & von Hippel, supra note 58, at 73–74, 79–80 (arguing that users innovate more
efficiently than manufacturers, because as consumers they know what innovations they want).
73
See B. Douthwaite et al., Why Promising Technologies Fail: The Neglected Role of User
Innovation During Adoption, 30 RES. POL’Y 819, 819, 830–32 (2001) (explaining that user innovations
improved farming technologies during the Green Revolution in Asia); see also Anil K. Gupta, From
Sink to Source: The Honey Bee Network Documents Indigenous Knowledge and Innovations in India, 1
INNOVATIONS 49, 49–50, 65 (2006) (reporting on a project attempting to document local innovations
and to “forge links” between local innovators and university researchers).
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originally designed. Even an innovation targeted to a foreign market may
fall flat without user participation in the design. A study by B.
Douthwaite, J.D.H. Keatinge, and J.R. Park, for example, probed the role
of user innovation in adoption of agricultural technologies intended to
assist development in Asia.74 The researchers concluded that user
innovation and interaction between the technology originators and local
users are critically important, especially as technologies or local
agricultural systems become more complex.75 Recognizing this, Anil
Gupta and his Honey Bee Network provide a means of documenting,
sharing, and commercializing grassroots user innovations in India.76
3. User Innovation and the “Permission to Innovate” IP Culture
Another relevant feature of user innovation is the extent to which it
involves functional improvements to existing technology.77 While users
may be large corporate entities, often they are individuals unlikely to
engage in ex ante licensing transactions to obtain “permission to
innovate.”78 Moreover, because user innovation often occurs as a side
effect of use rather than deriving from a research and development
program, even corporate users may not plan in advance to improve on the
technologies they are using. Because users tend to make heterogeneous
functional inventions while manufacturers tend to make innovations that
spring from their expertise in standardization, safety, ease of manufacture,
and returns to scale,79 user innovation and manufacturer innovation are
often recursive, meaning that an ongoing dialogue of innovation is most
productive of technological advance.80 These characteristics of user
innovation mean that the patent law doctrine of repair and reconstruction,81
the first sale (or patent exhaustion) doctrine,82 and the extent to which
74

Douthwaite et al., supra note 73, at 819–20.
Id. at 834–35.
76
Gupta, supra note 73, at 61–64.
77
See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing the important role of “lead user[s]” of
existing technologies in user innovations); Henkel & von Hippel, supra note 58, at 75 (arguing that
lead user innovations are eventually in demand in the mainstream market).
78
Viktor Braun & Cornelius Herstatt, Barriers to User-Innovation: The Paradigm of “Permission
to Innovate,” in 2006 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 176 (2006) (discussing problems posed by a “permission culture”). Henkel & von
Hippel, supra note 58, at 75.
79
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 66, 70–71.
80
Henkel & von Hippel, supra note 58, at 75, 82–84.
81
5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[3] (2005). The repair and reconstruction
doctrine holds that a purchaser of a patented item may repair it without the permission of the patentee
as long as the repairs do not amount to a complete reconstruction of the patented item (essentially
making a new item). See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342, 346
(1961) (discussing the doctrine as it relates to automobile repair).
82
See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 170 L. Ed. 2d 996, 1000, 1003 (2008)
(Supreme Court reaffirmation of the patent exhaustion doctrine). The first sale doctrine holds that a
patentee’s rights are “exhausted” when a patented product is sold, leaving the purchaser free to do with
75
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purchasers’ rights to use and modify their purchases may be limited by
non-negotiable license and contract terms (such as those involved in recent
controversies involving farmer seed-saving practices)83 are important in
determining whether there are barriers to user innovation.
4. User Innovation and Development
While user innovation occurs throughout the world, it seems likely that
user innovation is of particular importance to developing countries.84 The
local needs and preferences of citizens of developing countries are less
likely to be accounted for in mass markets both because those citizens will
be less likely to constitute economically important blocks of consumers
and because mass market goods are likely to be designed in developed
countries.85 User innovation thus is an important means of adapting mass
market technologies to the needs of developing country citizens. User
innovation building upon a primary technology is also more likely to be
within the capacity of some developing country innovators, who may lack
sophisticated engineering training but be able to exploit local knowledge
and expertise in their innovative activities.86 Thus, though making space
for user innovation in the global IP regime is of general importance, it may
be of particular importance to the developing world.
B. Open and Collaborative Innovation
The opening years of the twenty-first century have seen an outpouring
of interest in the deployment of open and collaborative processes for
innovative endeavors.87 The buzzwords “open” and “collaborative” have
been used to describe projects ranging from more distributed approaches to
it as he or she wishes. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
83
See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1026 & n.3, 1028–29, 1142 (1998) (discussing similar issues in the context of
copyright protection); Liam Seamus O’Melinn, Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property
Revolution is Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 168–72 (2007)
(discussing “suicide seeds” which do not propagate, thereby preventing farmers from using seeds
procured from harvest); Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 133 (2006) (arguing that
“[b]y licensing chattels rather than selling them, intellectual property owners can circumvent public
legislation and expand the protection of intellectual property far beyond the scope envisioned by
federal and state governments”).
84
See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 51–61 (discussing local innovations in India).
85
See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing
Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1051–55 (2005) (addressing the
issue of under-production of goods for developing countries in the context of medication).
86
See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 54, 61 (giving as examples a tractor built from scrap
materials by a grassroots innovator with a fourth grade education, as well as a method of using cow
urine for cooking fuel invented by a local farmer).
87
For a fascinating compendium of relevant articles about many forms of “open” innovation, see
OPEN SOURCES 2.0 (Chris DiBona, Mark Stone, and Danese Cooper, eds., 2006). See generally
BENKLER, supra note 5 (discussing the issues raised in this section).
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innovation by commercial firms to data repositories such as the Human
Genome Project,89 to works created entirely by online collaborations, such
as Wikipedia.90 Open and collaborative innovation is common among user
communities. Studies have documented the phenomenon among users of
sports equipment, computers, early automobiles, the eighteenth century
iron industry, scientific research tools, and, of course, open source software
itself.91
While the most prominent and well-studied example of open and
collaborative production is open source software,92 in recent years, the
focus has shifted to attempts to bring the power of open and collaborative
innovation to bear on problems in agriculture and biotechnology.93 Some
of these projects revolve around putting together databases for use in
bioinformatics research.94 Still others attempt to put together portfolios of
technological building blocks and tools and then make them available to
participants in a limited commons, who agree to constraints on their uses
of the tools and obligations to contribute to the growth of the commons.95
The most recent potential entrant into this field is synthetic biology.
Synthetic biology aims eventually to provide a true engineering approach
to biological innovation by using a commonly available set of genetic
building blocks to produce a variety of customized biological products.96
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See, e.g., HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING
AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY 93–94 (2006) (discussing IBM’s transition to open innovation).

89
See, e.g., Kapczynski et al., supra note 85, at 1071 (describing the Human Genome Project as a
“commons-based initiative[]”).
90
Wikipedia: About, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
91
E.g., Shah, Open Beyond Software, supra note 68, at 340–41; VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 27–
28; Franke & Shah, supra note 39, at 157–58; Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open
Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation 3–4 (Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley Sch. Of Law, Working Paper No. 368, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543;
Meyer, supra note 42, at 4–7; Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse That Roared: Resistance and
Accommodation to Patenting in Academic Science, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (forthcoming
2006); Shah, From Innovation to Firm Formation, supra note 68.
92
See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37 (describing the success of open source software).
93
E.g., Rai, “Open and Collaborative” Research, supra note 39, at 131; Andrés Guadamuz
González, Open Source: Licenses in Scientific Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321, 323–24, 333 (2006);
Yann Joly, Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia Revisited, 59 ME. L. REV. 385, 386–87,
389, 391, 394–95 (2007); Stephen M. Maurer, Open Source Drug Discovery: Finding A Niche (Or
Maybe Several), 76 UMKC L. REV. 405, 410, 413–15 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to
Revolution? Patent-Based Open Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 340, 361–62 (2007); Rai, supra note 12,
at 1441.
94
See, e.g., International HapMap Project, http://snp.cshl.org/thehapmap.html.en (last visited Oct.
11, 2008).
95
See, e.g., About PIPRA (The Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture),
www.pipra.org./en/about.en.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008) (describing their work helping those in
developing countries access new agricultural technologies); CAMBIA Initiative for Open Innovation,
www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008) (providing tools for working
toward a “commons of capability” in the life sciences).
96
Joachim Henkel & Stephen M. Maurer, The Economics of Synthetic Biology, 3 MOLECULAR
SYS. BIOLOGY 117, 117 (2007); Kumar & Rai, supra note 39 at 1745; Arti Rai & James Boyle,
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Open and collaborative innovation embodies a fundamentally different
view of the innovative process than the traditional seller-oriented paradigm
that motivates high protection IP regimes.97 The traditional model assumes
that innovation is the province of “inventors,” who must be awarded
exclusive rights over their innovations to motivate them to make relatively
large investments of time, money, and effort so that they can go above and
beyond the ordinary skill in the art.98 Because of this focus on investment,
some sense of the fungibility of inventive effort underlies the traditional
model.
The basic insight underlying open and collaborative innovation, on the
other hand, is that in some situations it is more effective for contributors to
an innovative project (who are often current or potential users) to selfselect their own tasks based on their own interests, experiences, and
expertise rather than for a project manager either to assign tasks to a preexisting Research and Development (R&D) team or to search for and
locate individuals with the necessary skills and experience.99
Though community-based innovation involving collaboration and
reciprocal sharing is probably as old as human society, the Internet and
other digital technology dramatically extend the possible scope of such
community-based approaches. First, technology allows many more people
to participate in a given project, by providing access and mechanisms for
structuring tasks and by facilitating communication that can overcome the
high overhead often inherent in attempts to scale up cooperative
activities.100 Second, technology allows collaborators to match up
dispersed sources of problems and solutions, expanding the diversity of
Synthetic Biology: Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 5 PLOS
BIOLOGY e58, e58 (2007).
97
See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 5 at 35–58 (exploring the economic aspects of innovation and
non-market production of innovation); Rai, supra note 39 (proposing collaborative research as a new
model for medicine and biotechnology). See generally OPEN SOURCES 2.0, supra note 87 (providing
detailed analysis of numerous aspects of open and collaborative innovation); Benkler, supra note 37
(analyzing Linux through the prism of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm); Harhoff et al. supra note 34
(discussing why free revealing, though surprising to economists, benefits innovators and users of
technology).
98
See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 5, at 42 (describing the “Romantic Maximizer” as the “idealtype strategy that underlies patents and copyrights,” and as a “single author or inventor laboring
creatively—hence romantic—but in expectation of royalties, rather than immortality, beauty, or
truth.”).
99
See Benkler, supra note 37 at 406–23 (contrasting the process through which workers are
assigned tasks in the traditional firm with the process through which workers find tasks in a “peer
production enterprise”). The formation of innovation “teams” in this manner is only one example of a
larger phenomenon of emergent group activity. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY 109
(2008) (describing the trend towards group activity using a variety of examples, including the
development of Wikipedia).
100
In the software world this problem is known as Brooks’s Law. Fred Brooks coined what
became known as Brooks’s Law in his book The Mythical Man-Month. FREDERICK P. BROOKS, THE
MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH (1975). Brooks’s Law states: “Adding manpower to a late software project
makes it later.” Id., at 25.
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experience and expertise brought to bear on a problem and making it more
likely that someone with the right set of skills will address the problem.101
Four features of open and collaborative innovation are particularly
important here. First, like user innovation, open and collaborative
innovation does not rely in traditional fashion on IP-based incentives to
invent, disclose, and disseminate. Second, like user innovation, it makes
use of heterogeneous and local knowledge. Third, open and collaborative
innovation is often not nationally based, but rather makes use of a global
network of digitally linked innovators. Finally, open and collaborative
innovation raises questions concerning private ordering and governance,
which do not figure importantly in the traditional IP paradigm.
1. Incentives for Open and Collaborative Innovation.
Open and collaborative innovation regimes all rely, almost by
definition, on motives for participation that are not premised on exclusive
control of innovative results by individual participants. While in some
cases these motives are purely hedonic, the crucial insight that allows these
models to propagate beyond the realm of hackers and hobbyists is that
participation in open and collaborative innovation can provide other
rewards that are either equal to or better than the rewards of proprietary
innovation.102 These rewards are primarily of four types: inexpensive and
flexible use benefits; tailoring of the product to heterogeneous specific
needs; benefits related to participation in the project itself (such as
enjoyment, skill-building, and reputation enhancement); and
complementary benefits (such as the ability to base a business model on
the availability of the collaboratively produced innovation or otherwise use
the innovation as a platform for some other rewarding purpose).103 The
fact that an open and collaborative process allows tasks to be divided
among many innovators also reduces the requisite investment in the project
by most contributors, making it more likely that these other benefits will be
sufficient to incentivize participation.104
101
See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 37, at 414–15 (“The widely distributed model of information
production will better identify who is the best person to produce a specific component of a project, all
abilities and availability to work on the specific module within the specific time frame considered.”)
(emphasis omitted).
102
See, e.g., Eric von Hippel, Horizontal Innovation Networks–By and for Users, 16 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 293, 304–07 (2007) (describing the benefits of free-revealing and noting that those
benefits can outweigh those provided by patent or licensing protection).
103
See Benkler, supra note 37, at 423–43 (describing contributors’ motivations in terms of
monetary rewards, intrinsic hedonic rewards, and social-psychological rewards); Harhoff et al., supra
note 37, at 1759–67 (developing a model to systematically assess the profitability of a user/innovator’s
decision to share or hide information); von Hippel, supra note 102, at 304–07 (2007) (describing the
benefits of free-revealing); Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 37, at 3–12, 23 (identifying career
advancement, the feeling of creativity, connection with the hacker community, user need, and the
opportunity to improve programming skills as important motivators).
104
Benkler, supra note 384 at 435.
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Many participants in open and collaborative innovation are prospective
users of the innovative results.105 There are a number of reasons that users
might choose to participate in an open and collaborative endeavor rather
than going it alone, waiting for a commercial product to become available,
or attempting to free ride off the open and collaborative projects of others.
As discussed above, users of a technology have different and localized
information about their needs and experiences than that which
manufacturers have.106 Transferring this information to manufacturers is
costly for both users and manufacturers.107 In many cases, collaborating
with other users is very effective, providing a way to develop
improvements that manufacturers are not yet ready to adopt and to pool
user interests and experiences so that each participant gets back a result
that is worth more than the cost in time or money of her own
contribution.108
2. Heterogeneity and Reliance on Localized Knowledge
Open and collaborative innovation projects must compete with
proprietary means of production, which will often benefit from
manufacturing expertise, economies of scale, the ability to hire experts,
marketing expertise, and so forth.109 Open and collaborative innovation
will be preferable when there are advantages to be gained from a dispersed
approach. A dispersed approach is most likely to succeed where
innovation bumps up against heterogeneity—either in the needs of users
for customized and adapted products or in the capabilities, experiences,
and insights that are necessary to produce the innovation.
There is, of course, a Hayekian dispersed information component to
the IP system itself—patents are intended to elicit investment in projects
which will fulfill consumer demand and encourage inventive activity by
those who demonstrate likelihood of success, either by their own
willingness to put up the money for their R&D efforts or by their ability to
attract investment from others.110 The problem with the IP approach is that
105
See, e.g., Harhoff et al., supra note 37, at 1768 (“[P]romoting the development, free revealing,
and widespread utilization of user innovations may often be in the best interest of profit-seeking userinnovators, and welfare improving as well.”); von Hippel & von Krogh, supra note 64, at 296–97
(noting that the practice of free-revealing innovations is widespread in the user communities of several
different technologies).
106
See infra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
107
See generally von Hippel, supra note 38 (discussing “sticky” information and how such
information is costly to transfer from one party to another).
108
See Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms, supra note 65, for a simple model of these
tradeoffs.
109
VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 70–71.
110
See F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 95 (1948) (“[T]he real problem is
rather how it can be brought about that as much of the available knowledge as possible is used. This
raises for a competitive society the question, not how we can ‘find’ the people who know best, but
rather what institutional arrangements are necessary in order that the unknown persons who have
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it does not scale well to innovation that would proceed best by iterative and
collaborative input from a large number of diverse inventors performing
relatively modular tasks. The pace of obtaining and licensing patents is too
slow and the transaction costs are too high for a dispersed collaborative
approach to be workable. Firm-based collaborative innovation, on the
other hand, requires a high degree of a priori top-down management to
assemble a team of personnel with the necessary variety of expertise.
Firm-based research and development thus unavoidably reproduces some
of the difficulties inherent in a command-and-control approach to
innovation that justify having a patent system (rather than direct
government funding of R&D or a prize system) to begin with. While
patent pools can provide means of sharing technology in industries where
innovation is performed by large repeat-player firms, patent pools are also
too inflexible to permit highly dispersed, heterogeneous collaboration
between self-identified participants.
Because they are based on a different paradigm of innovation, open
and collaborative approaches will likely produce different innovative
results than a mass market proprietary system. Importantly, an open and
collaborative innovation project leaves users with the ongoing freedom to
tinker with, reconfigure, and recombine the resulting innovations.111
Platform technologies produced in an open and collaborative fashion may
combine many of the robustness advantages of mass production with the
ability to tailor and build upon the platforms to meet heterogeneous
needs.112 An open and collaborative innovation process can produce both
highly robust products with widespread appeal (such as Linux) and
customized products that appeal to heterogeneous needs (such as many of
the small open source software projects on SourceForge). These
heterogeneous, “long tail” products may not have the robustness of a massproduced product, but without the open and collaborative innovation
process they would not exist at all.113
3. Global Network Organizational Structure
The potential for open and collaborative innovation is, by its nature,
knowledge specially suited to a particular task are most likely to be attracted to the task.”). Hayek
himself was skeptical about the effectiveness of IP in producing valuable innovation. F.A. HAYEK, The
Origins of Liberty, Property and Justice, in THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 36–37
(W.W. Bartley, III ed., 1988).
111
See, e.g., Nikolaus Franke & Eric von Hippel, Satisfying Heterogeneous User Needs via
Innovation Toolkits: The Case of Apache Security Software, 32 RES. POL’Y 1199 (2003) (asserting that
an “innovation toolkit,” such as the one in Apache software, helps satisfy diverse user needs).
112
See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183,
192–94 (2004) (discussing how the adaptability of software like Apache helps satisfy diverse user
needs, and that this is a reason that commercial companies might contribute to open innovation).
113
CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG-TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF
MORE (2006).
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constrained by the nature of communication technology. In the past,
collaborative enterprises often involved localized face-to-face
They also employed available communication
communities.114
technologies such as letter correspondence, trade publications, and
journals.115 While many projects still employ those “old-fashioned”
collaborative methods, the Internet has led to an explosion of collaborative
potential by reducing the cost and increasing the speed of long distance
communications, permitting the rapid communication of both text and
graphics, and allowing communication at a distance to come close to
replicating the many-to-many character of discussions in geographically
localized communities.116 The search capabilities of the Internet also make
it possible for dispersed groups of potential innovators to find one another,
thus making customized innovation more feasible.
The result of these communication advances is that the open and
collaborative innovation paradigm is able not only to find, make use of,
and respond to heterogeneous and localized preferences and experience but
also to operate via a global networked organizational structure which is not
defined by geographical or political boundaries.
The increasing
importance of software and other information as products and as tools for
producing customized products also means that this global network
sometimes can replace not only the research and development capacity of
the industrial sector but also its manufacturing capability.
4.

Governance and Private Ordering in Open and Collaborative
Innovation

Despite the occasional rhetoric of some enthusiasts, one should not
think of open and collaborative approaches to innovation as necessarily
“emergent” or “self-organizing” in any strong sense of those terms. Most
open and collaborative projects are not centrally organized in the
assignment of tasks or even in the selection of tasks to be accomplished.
Nonetheless, most have some coordination of control over decisionmaking concerning the final product and some means for resolving
disputes.117 And while some open and collaborative innovation is
structured almost entirely by unarticulated social norms (such as those of
the traditional scientific research community),118 many projects have more
114

See generally Meyer, supra note 42, for historical examples.
Id. at 8–11.
116
Benkler, supra note 37, at 404–06.
117
See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37 at 157–71 (explaining how open source projects are
coordinated through individual incentives, cultural norms, and leadership); Benkler, supra note 37 at
441–43 (describing the integration and quality control processes of various peer production
enterprises).
118
See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology
Transfer, in ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
VOLUME 16, at 102–07 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005) (discussing the social norms of scientific
115
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formal governance structures which often involve centralized decisionmaking of some kind and sometimes involve highly centralized control
over official versions of the project results.119 One way to look at open and
collaborative innovation, then, is as an alternative to the firm which, like a
firm, structures transactions to internalize and systematize them and thus
reduce their costs, but which also exploits a market-type information
processing system for the assignment of tasks and design of the product.120
Open and collaborative innovation is thus not unstructured, but
differently structured from seller-based innovation methods. It requires a
fairly high degree of private ordering, much of which depends not only on
IP law but also on other legal structures, such as contract and licensing
law, and on social structure such as community norms.121
In order to structure and govern their collaborative endeavors, at least
some innovation projects, while purporting to eschew proprietary
limitations, rely heavily on IP protections as means of controlling the uses
which can be made of the results of their efforts and of controlling who has
access to them. Thus, collaborative projects are structured around not only
the need to organize the efforts of the collaborative process, but also the
need to delineate and govern the unavoidable and increasingly important
boundaries between open and collaborative innovation and proprietary
approaches.122
These privately ordered “open” regimes often create not untrammeled
contributions to the public domain but limited commons environments in
which innovators seek to exercise significant hegemony over the uses of
their innovations.123 The most well-known example of such a regime is the
use of the “copyleft” or “viral” clause of the General Public License (GPL)

researchers, and how those norms might change in response to legal and policy changes); Emmanuelle
Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs,
19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2008) (describing the social norms that French chefs follow to respect one another’s
intellectual property). See generally Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual
Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999), for an explanation of the term
“norm” and the role of norms in basic research.
119
See, e.g., ERIC RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 87–92 (2001) (discussing the concept of
“ownership” of open source projects); WEBER, supra note 37, at 88–93 (using the example of Linux
and its creator Linus Torvalds).
120
Benkler, supra note 37, at 406–23.
121
See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37 at 84–86 (discussing how open source licensing produces
social structure); Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 11–35
(2006) (discussing whether the GNU GPL is a contract or a license, and the implications for
enforceability).
122
See, e.g., Siobhan O’Mahony & Beth Bechky, Boundary Organizations: Enabling
Collaboration Among Unexpected Allies, X ADMIN. SCI. Q. Y, P (2008).
123
See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1331, 1357–62 (2004) (discussing legal approaches aimed at preventing “one-sided
expropriation” of the public domain). See generally Molly Shaffer van Houweling, The New
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008) (comparing IP licenses to servitudes in land).
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copyright license to control downstream uses of open source software.124
While patent licensing has so far played a much less significant role in
open source software projects, the importance of patents in both
constructing and obstructing collaborative projects is certain to increase if
open innovation practices become more prevalent in areas such as
biotechnology where copyright protection is unavailable or does not cover
the relevant aspects of the technology.125 Finally, as “open source”
projects in biology and other arenas begin to center less around software
code and more around commonly-held data, trade secrecy is also likely to
play a more important role in constructing collaborative projects, as a
means to limit access to commonly held data to those who agree to certain
rules about use of the resulting innovation.126
Thus, even “open and collaborative” projects display a balance of
openness and control. In structuring the innovative process, many open
and collaborative projects rely rather heavily on reach-through-type and
boilerplate licensing practices akin to the shrink-wrap and click-wrap
licenses often criticized when used by proprietary copyright holders.127
124
For an explanation of the basic principles of the GPL, see A Quick Guide to GPLv3,
http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008). For the terms
of the GPL, see GNU General Public License, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2008). See also, Kumar, supra note 121 at 8–9 (discussing the terms of the license and
critiquing the use of the term “viral” to describe it).
125
See, e.g., Rai, supra note 39 (discussing the possible use of collaborative innovation in
medicine); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1401–05 (describing the concept of open source patent); Robin
Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
117 (2004) (arguing that while open source biotechnology may implicate the doctrine of patent misuse,
it should not be considered as such); González, supra note 93, at 325 (suggesting “a new licensing
model for patentable scientific research that allows access and dissemination to diverse fields of
endeavor”); Henkel & Maurer, supra note 96 (examining which IP practices will lead the emerging
field of synthetic biology to the greatest success); Kapczynski et al., supra note 85 (arguing that public
sector institutions such as U.S. universities should change their licensing practices to a system that
improves access to biomedical innovation); Kumar & Rai, supra note 39, at 1749 (noting that
biotechnology “has already proven difficult for intellectual property law to manage”); Mann, supra
note 12 (analyzing the relationship between patents and open source technology); Maurer, supra note
93, at 406–07 (arguing that open source ideas would work well drug development and exploring why
there is little open collaboration in that field as yet); Merges, supra note 112 (stressing the importance
of the public domain); David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004) (assessing the “feasibility of applying open source
principles to the biotechnology industry”); Petherbridge, supra note 93 (discussing the role of patents
in creating an “‘open science’ framework”); Rai, supra note 12 (expanding upon Dusollier’s article and
addressing how open source concepts impact industrial organizations); Rai & Boyle, supra note 96
(noting that synthetic biology poses special challenges in IP law because the innovations are not
necessarily protected by copyright).
126
See, e.g., J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons
for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 315, 348–51 (2003).
127
See generally Douglas A. Hass, A Gentlemen’s Agreement: Assessing the Gnu General Public
License and Its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 213 (2007) (discussing the Gnu
public license’s application to Linux); van Houweling, supra note 123 (comparing IP licenses to
servitudes in land); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239 (1995) (discussing shrinkwrap licenses generally); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative
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The GPL is dependent on strong reach-through or “viral” provisions, the
enforceability of which is bound to vary among jurisdictions and has rarely
been litigated.128 The Creative Commons “Share Alike” copyright license
to facilitate open production of creative works is similarly dependent on
rather strong interpretations of licensing doctrine.129
The issues of contract, licensing, and competition law raised by the
governance of open and collaborative innovation practices further
demonstrate the inadequacy of a view of innovation based solely on a
simplistic seller-based model.
5. Open and Collaborative Innovation and Development
A premise of this Article is that the need for a broader perspective on
innovation than that reflected in the TRIPS agreement is a matter of
immediate concern to developed and developing countries alike.
Nonetheless, there are aspects of open and collaborative innovation that
may make it particularly important to the technological advancement of
developing countries.130 First, of course, is the fact that the fruits of many
open and collaborative projects will be cheaply available, either as
software products or as blueprints or data which are made available over
the Internet. Quite aside from a low initial price, however, as already
noted, the incentive structure of these projects means that the results of
many open and collaborative projects are likely to be highly customizable
platform technologies.131 Such innovations may be particularly useful to
developing countries, which may not have the resources to develop their
own platform technologies, but may have the desire and ability to adapt

Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 644–47 (2004) (discussing licensing of
open-source software).
128
See generally Kumar, supra note 121, for a discussion of enforceability problems with the
GNU GPL.
129
See Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 390–91, 395 (arguing that “Creative Commons' ideology
communicates a strong proprietary message” and that “reliance on a property regime may undermine
Creative Commons' agenda by further strengthening the regulatory power of property rights”).
130
See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of
Open Source Software, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 68 (2006) (“[Open source software] presents an
ideal means by which governments can attempt to substantially lower costs of software acquisition. . . .
This cost concern is especially pronounced in the debt-laden governments of developing countries.”);
Daniel F. Olejko, Comment, Charming a Snake: Open Source Strategies for Developing Countries
Disillusioned with TRIPs, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 855, 877–81 (2007) (arguing that open source
software is cost-effective for the governments of developing countries and that the intellectual property
of indigenous peoples can be protected through licensing). See generally Gilberto Câmara & Frederico
Fonseca, Information Policies and Open Source Software in Developing Countries, 58 J. AMER. SOC’Y
INFO. SCI. & TECH. 121 (2007) (discussion of different types of open source software and suitability for
developing countries); Gupta, supra note 73 (providing a case study of the Honey Bee Network in
India); Steven Weber, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (2003), available at
http://www.ssrc.org/programs/itic/publications/ITST_materials/webernote2.pdf
(discussing
how
developing countries can benefit from the use of open source software).
131
E.g., Mann, supra note 12, at 11.
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platform technologies to local conditions, preferences, and needs.132
Whether they are computer programs, seeds, or some other technology, the
products of open and collaborative innovation will tend, by their nature, to
lend themselves to local adaptation. This realization is reflected in
initiatives aimed at either adopting open source software as a standard for
government use in developing countries or encouraging its use.133 In South
Africa, for example, the government in early 2007 adopted a national
policy for open source implementation.134 The policy commits the
government both to use open source software as a default choice and to
encourage its use in the country.135
The open and collaborative innovation process, to the extent that it
involves networks of far-flung collaborators in cyberspace, also promises
to provide opportunities for education, skill-building, and training for those
in developing countries who have a requisite threshold level of education
and skills.136 Because many open and collaborative innovation projects
naturally have a global scope, a country can benefit from local
participation in such a project without having a local critical mass of
technical skills necessary for a stand-alone ground-up project. Though a
globally dispersed collaborative project is probably most easily conducted
in the arena of software or some other intangible product, collaborative
innovation in tangible technology may also be possible through
communications among dispersed individuals. Scientists and engineers
have collaborated at a distance through journals and letters for centuries.
The Internet provides a potential means to scale up such collaboration to a
global network of self-identified individuals. While those in locations
remote from others with similar technological interests certainly remain at
a disadvantage, improvements in digital communications provide at least
some potential for participation by such individuals.137
132

Olejko, supra note 130, at 880.
See, e.g., Elzio Barreto & Carlos Caminada, Brazil is Extending Microsoft a Challenge;
Developing Nations Urged to Use Free Software, HOUSTON CHRON., May 12, 2005, at 4, available at
LEXIS, News Library, HCHRN File; Olejko, supra note 130 at 875–81.
134
See SOUTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE & ADMINISTRATION, POLICY ON FREE
AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE USE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 3 (2006), available at
http://www.oss.gov.za/FOSS_OC_POLICY_2006.pdf; see also http://www.oss.gov.za/ (noting that the
policy was approved by the Cabinet on February 22, 2007).
135
Id.
136
See Chon, supra note 6, at 2897 (discussing the importance of reducing limitations on sharing
educational materials between nations).
137
See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 49–50 (utilizing an electronic database, website, and
newsletter to share traditional knowledge in India). Of course, the benefits of open and collaborative
innovation are only of use to those who can deploy the resulting products or participate in the
innovative process. Professor Chon and others are clearly correct that there is a need to balance the
importance of promoting innovation—even as more broadly understood here—with the provision of
basic human needs such as food, public health, security, and education that are necessary for human
beings to flourish in many respects, including the ability to participate in creative and innovative
activity. Chon, supra note 6, at 2893. See generally Denis Borges Barbosa, Margaret Chon & Andrés
133
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Besides the potential for adopting, adapting, and participating in the
recent technology-based revival of open and collective innovation
practices, many developing countries are home to indigenous groups which
already have traditional open and collaborative innovation practices.138
Much of the debate about traditional knowledge focuses either on means to
preserve traditional cultural goods or on finding ways to commodify
traditional knowledge so that the communities that produced it are
compensated when others use it.139 Because these questions relate to the
propertization of knowledge, these discussions are often associated with IP
(and are included in WIPO’s Development Agenda).140 Perhaps because
the discussion of traditional knowledge in the international arena is
motivated largely by a desire to open similar markets for developing
country knowledge goods, the discussion may not have focused enough on
the continuing creative potential of such communities.141 One benefit of
global attention to the potential advantages of open and collaborative
innovation practices might be to recognize and galvanize the innovative
potential of indigenous and other more traditional collaborative innovators.
III. THE TROUBLE WITH TRIPS: CONSTRAINED BY AN OUTMODED
INNOVATION PARADIGM
As mentioned in the Introduction, much of the criticism of TRIPS, as
well as most of the impetus for the progress reflected in the Doha
Declarations and the adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda, has
focused on the failure of TRIPS to balance adequately the need to promote
future innovation with current needs for access to technology, particularly
in the public health arena.142 Here I leave aside those pressing concerns
and focus, in light of the evolving paradigms of innovation explored in Part
II, on TRIPS—particularly its patent provisions—as innovation regulation.
TRIPS reflects a particular mass market seller-based view of innovation
which tends to evoke a one-size-fits-all high protection IP regime. The
Moncayo von Hase, Slouching Towards Development in International Intellectual Property, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 71 (2007) (discussing how international intellectual property law must incorporate
the social welfare goals of developing nations).
138
See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 50 (discussing the Honey Bee Network as a source for
Indian traditional practices).
139
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1032–34 (2007) (discussing and critiquing the move toward propertization
of traditional knowledge); Safrin, supra note 51, at 1940 (same). But see Chander & Sunder, supra
note 123, at 1345 (pointing out the inequalities often present in access to the non-propertized “public
domain”).
140
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 8, at para. 18.
141
But see Raustiala, supra note 139, at 1034 (expressing concern that propertization of
traditional knowledge may have negative effects on creativity within indigenous communities);
Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 109
(2007) (discussing the innovative nature of traditional cultures in meeting the demands of the market).
142
See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
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high protection baseline of TRIPS reflects, among other things, its primary
mission as an instrument of trade, rather than innovation, and its genesis
during a period of manufacturer-based innovation aimed at producing mass
market goods.143 A trade paradigm based on a concept of static
comparative advantage144 is best suited to mass market goods, which can
be effectively designed and produced in one place and shipped off for use
in another.
While the pharmaceutical products, off-the-shelf software and mass
market entertainment products which dominated the context in which
TRIPS was negotiated might fit this conception, TRIPS locked in a set of
minimum standards based on the mass manufacturer model at precisely the
wrong moment.145 As discussed in Part II, the turn of the twenty-first
century has seen a virtual explosion in the importance of information
technology, leading to a surge in user innovation and open and
collaborative models of innovation made possible (and certainly more
visible) by the World Wide Web and other digital technologies.146 A
simplistic trade perspective is singularly inapt for these new modes of
innovative practice. Indeed, the very concept of “trade” is often in apropos
since these innovation practices are simply not well-described as means by
which goods invented and produced in one place are sold in another.
The TRIPS “minimum standards” commitment to a mass market
seller-based innovation regime is reflected in its requirement of equal
treatment of different technological arenas;147 its crabbed approach to
enforcement exceptions148 (reflecting an assumption that unauthorized use
constitutes free riding, is nearly always undesirable and should be
permitted only in closely cabined circumstances); and its stringent
restrictions on compulsory licensing.149 The lack of any substantive
maxima for IP protection, along with the agreement’s failure to put any
143
See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS ix–x (2d
ed. 2003) (giving an overview and background of the TRIPS Agreement); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE
POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 3–4 (2003) (arguing
that TRIPS was molded to protect the markets of particular IP rights holders—notably the major
pharmaceutical companies).
144
See, e.g., Bruce Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Helping Infant Economies Grow:
Foundations of Trade Policies for Developing Countries, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 141 (2006) (arguing for a
concept of dynamic comparative advantage which would take into account the potential for evolving
economic capacity).
145
Steve Charnovitz argues that the “exaggerated claim that TRIPS establishes common
minimum international standards” is incorrect and countries are free to provide lesser protection to their
own nationals. Charnovitz, WTO in 2020, supra note 35 at n.22. Nonetheless, as Charnovitz
acknowledges, id. at 171, governments are unlikely as a political matter to provide stronger IP rights to
foreigners than to their own citizens.
146
See supra text accompanying notes 38–54.
147
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.
148
See id. art. 30 (imposing limits on permissible exceptions to patent rights).
149
See id. art. 31 (setting out limitations on permissible means by which countries can provide for
use of patented inventions under compulsory licenses).
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limits on restrictive licensing practices or to deal with private ordering
more generally, also reflect this myopic focus on one specific innovative
model.150 While it is certainly desirable to read TRIPS flexibilities more
expansively than they have been read in the past, it is nonetheless unlikely
that an international IP regime so thoroughly grounded in a single mass
market model will be optimally suited to a world of diverse innovation
paradigms.
This indictment of TRIPS is not intended to suggest that national
legislatures have done much better at crafting innovation policy regimes.
TRIPS was patterned after high protection national intellectual policies,
particularly those of the United States.151 The United States has been
struggling to adapt its own patent law to the changing innovation
landscape, a struggle reflected in stalemates between the pharmaceutical
and information technology industries in attempted legislative revision152
and in Supreme Court intervention to dial back some of the rigid
interpretations of patent doctrine by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals.153 The point, though, is that it is particularly problematic to
enshrine a one-size-fits-all approach to innovation in an international
agreement both because states are likely to be heterogeneous in their
preferred innovative approaches and because, as a practical matter, renegotiating an international agreement is fraught with difficulty.
With that said, the recent history of TRIPS in the access to medicines
context does provide some grounds for optimism and a model of how
regime-shifting,154 and what Scott Burris and collaborators have called a
nodal approach to governance,155 might lead to incremental progress.156
150
See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System:
New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205, 214 (2006) (stating
that international treaties should contain user rights); Dreyfuss, supra note 6 (arguing for explicit
protection of user rights in international patent law).
151
See references supra note 143.
152
See Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
389, 389–91 (2007) (discussing the divergent interests of the two sectors).
153
E.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008); KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734–35 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746,
1760 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007); eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193, 207 (2005).
154
See Chon, supra note 6, at 2855; Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 42–43
(2004) (discussing the response to TRIPS in the context of essential drugs); Peter K. Yu, International
Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1,
27 (2007). See generally Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing, Changes in Governance:
A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing the
evolving mechanisms of international governance); Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in
Intellectual Property and Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 363 (2004).
155
Burris et al., supra note 11, at 33. See generally John Braithwaite, Methods of Power for
Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 297 (2004); Scott
Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335 (2004); Peter Drahos,
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Further, a number of commentators have suggested creative approaches to
interpreting TRIPS Articles 27 and 30 flexibly, especially in light of the
Objectives and Principles outlined in Articles 7 and 8.157 These attempts
are commendable and essential to the promotion of innovation globally.
Here I provide only an overview of the substantive challenges to adapting
TRIPS to new modes of innovation before focusing in Part IV on
administrative mechanisms for an evolving international innovation policy
regime.
A. TRIPS as an Instrument of Trade in “Knowledge Goods”: A Poor Fit
with Emerging Innovation Paradigms
The fact that TRIPS is first and foremost a trade instrument, focused
on opening global markets to an existing pipeline of products rather than
on promoting innovation in any broader sense, undermines its effectiveness
of TRIPS as an innovation regime. It leaves little room for adapting the
global IP regime to new and diverse innovative practices. Strong IP
protection presents itself as an apparently natural supplement to a free
trade regime so as to permit (and encourage) developed countries to exploit
a comparative advantage in production of intangible knowledge goods.
Innovation is not a good fit for this comparative advantage model
except in the short term. The comparative advantage concept depends on
the idea that global welfare will be improved when countries specialize in
the types of production they do best. However, the concept of comparative
advantage is inappropriately static and simply inapt when applied to
innovation.158 Innovative capacity is essentially a kind of infrastructure,
like roads and communication networks, which underlies the ability to
develop other capacities. Because diverse perspectives further innovation,
enhancing global welfare may depend on spreading innovative capacity

Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV.
401 (2004). These authors argue that “nodal governance” is a weapon that can be employed by both
the weak and the strong. Specifically, Drahos describes the original methods by which the
pharmaceutical industry obtained a high protection patent regime as an example of nodal governance,
Drahos, supra, at 405–06, yet argues that nodal governance provides an opportunity for developing
countries with respect to traditional knowledge, Drahos, supra, at 420–21. Thus, it remains unclear
whether the shift toward a less state-based international governance regime will benefit developing
countries in the IP debate in the long run. For general discussions of this issue see Burris et al., supra
note 154, at 1–2; Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 11, at 222–23.
156
See, e.g., Yu, supra note 6, at 401–02.
157
See, e.g., Barbosa et al., supra note 137, at 105–06; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying
Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 447–48; Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 22–23; Christopher
Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 17, at 19–42 (2006), available at
http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11716/.
158
See Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 144, at 141.
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159

broadly.
Since copying and building on pre-existing technology are
means of developing innovative capacity, strong IP rights may preclude
some countries from ever developing the innovative capacity needed to
develop and exploit a comparative advantage in some as-yet-undetermined
arena of innovation.160
Moreover, the focus on trade assumes an unrealistic fungibility
between innovations produced in different countries. Because, as
discussed in Part II, inventors are heterogeneous, innovation is
simultaneously more global and more local than the production of mass
market goods. Innovation in many cases builds incrementally on a global
pool of previous experience and technology and, as demonstrated by the
global scope of open source software projects, the best innovation may
combine ideas from individuals in widely dispersed locales. On the other
hand, many innovations are responsive to and tailored for local
circumstances and needs. Without local input, an imported invention may
fall short of its potential to increase welfare.161 This means that it is in the
global interest for every nation to develop the infrastructure and skill set to
engage in technical innovation so that it can both contribute to the global
pool of ideas and produce goods and services that are desirable in its
particular circumstances and culture. Innovation is not something which
can simply be “out-sourced” to another country. Just as users play an
important and different innovative role from manufacturers because of
their ability to tap into dispersed local knowledge, local innovators are
essential to the development of desirable technologies for local contexts.
The importance of user experience as a spur to innovation also
suggests that the balance between first comers and follow-on innovators,
which can be neglected when the focus is on opening up present markets,
may be particularly important in the global context. The optimal balance
between opening markets for knowledge goods, incentivizing foreign
investment, and allowing the “freedom to tinker” as a means of developing
local innovative capability and customizing innovation to local needs is
likely to vary from one country to the next and from one technology to the
next. Even where economic resources would be available in principle to
provide a “demand pull” to foreign inventors to provide technology
tailored to local circumstances, there is good reason to believe that
transferring the knowledge of local circumstances required for such
tailored innovation to foreign companies would be expensive and difficult.
Even in the United States and Europe, where the capacity of technology
159
For broad discussions of the relationship between IP, innovation, and human capabilities, see,
for example, Chon, supra note 6, at 2885; Samuelson, supra note 10, at 590–91.
160
See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 58–59 (1997).
161
See, e.g., Douthwaite et al., supra note 73, at 820 (discussing agricultural examples); Gupta,
supra note 73, at 49–50 (exploring a local network in India as a source of ideas).
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companies is high and the market for consumer goods is well-oiled, users
are still predominant in producing leading edge functional improvements
in many areas.162 In fact, industry has begun to realize the importance of
harnessing user experience as an engine of innovation and firms are
experimenting as to the best way to do so.163 The simplistic view of the
world as divided into “producers” and passive “consumers” is breaking
down in most arenas, yet the TRIPS Agreement’s focus on trade and static
comparative advantage obscures the dialectical nature of the innovation
process.
The trade paradigm is also inappropriate for many platform
technologies which are the locus of much of today’s open and
collaborative innovative activity. These technologies, such as computer
software, are foundational to the conduct of commerce and the production
of a variety of goods and services. Because of the important role they play
in facilitating other aspects of economic activity, there are strong national
interests in autonomous control of these technologies.164 Technical
excellence is not the only measure of social benefit in these cases. This is
particularly true because of the ongoing relationships between purchasers
and manufacturers of these technologies inherent in modern licensing
practice, as well as in the need for compatibility between different
programs running on different computer hardware. For a country to be
entirely dependent on a foreign company for its basic software platforms is
comparable not merely to having a foreign company build some of its
roads or airports, but to having a foreign company run the tollbooths or air
traffic control, maintaining ongoing control of a vital infrastructural
resource. At least some software and digital technology is a strategic
resource to which the concept of comparative advantage is at least partly
inapplicable.
Moreover, tying innovators globally to a particular innovation model
ends up betraying the very tenets of free trade itself. Free traders do not
argue that all countries should agree to a single approach to mining their
natural resources regardless of whether geological factors, the labor
market, and so forth are varied.165 Instead, the free trade premise of
comparative advantage assumes that each country will compete on the
162
See e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 97 (discussing “hackers” who tailored software to their
specific needs).
163
See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 133–34 (discussing “lead user idea-generation
techniques”); Nikolaus Franke & Frank Piller, Value Creation by Toolkits for User Innovation and
Design: The Case of the Watch Market, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 401, 402 (2004)
(analyzing user innovation toolkits from the customer perspective).
164
See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 371
(2005) (giving examples of use of government procurement power to shape technology).
165
Although, as Greenwald & Stiglitz point out, the temptation to view countries’ comparative
advantages in too static a fashion is one to which free traders too often succumb in general. Greenwald
& Stiglitz, supra note 144, at 141.
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basis of its own most efficient means of production.
A global
commitment to a one-size-fits-all innovation model may well have the
perverse result of privileging a mode of innovation that is less efficient in
producing a particular technological advance.167
B. TRIPS Flexibilities and Evolving Paradigms of Innovation
TRIPS sets out minimum standards of IP protection. For patents,
TRIPS specifies various minimum requirements involving patent coverage,
term, associated rights, and remedies for infringement.168 Of particular
interest for our purposes are Articles 27 and 28, dealing with patentable
subject matter and rights conferred, respectively. With certain exceptions,
Article 27 requires countries to make patents available “for any inventions
. . . in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application,” severely
constraining the possibility of a nuanced approach to patentable subject
matter.169 Article 27 also requires that patent rights be “enjoyable without
discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”170 Article 28 mandates
that patents confer on their owners exclusive rights “to prevent third parties
not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering
for sale, selling, or importing” their patented inventions.171 Article 33 adds
to the constraints by mandating a patent term of twenty years which may
be badly mismatched with the cumulative and collaborative pace of
invention in some areas.172
These basic all-encompassing requirements clearly reflect the mass
market seller-based innovation paradigm. In requiring that patents be
available without discrimination for all fields of technology, TRIPS
reflects the assumption that patents are equally appropriate and effective
for promoting innovation in all fields of technology. Similarly, in
mandating that patent rights include rights of exclusive making and use,
along with exclusive rights of sale, TRIPS reflects an assumption that all of
these exclusive rights are needed to promote innovation. User innovation
and open and collaborative innovation undermine these basic assumptions.
As discussed in Part II, the effectiveness of these alternative innovation
approaches varies depending on issues such as the modularity of a
particular technology, the extent to which users of a technology are likely
166
See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Electronic Uncertainty Within the International Trade Regime, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1379, 1382–83 (2000) (describing the basic free trade concept of comparative
advantage).
167
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 456.
168
TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 27, 28, 33, 44.
169
Id. art. 27.
170
Id.
171
Id. art. 28.
172
Id. art. 33.
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to have heterogeneous needs or diverse insights, the extent to which users
and other distributed innovators have the technical capacity to improve a
technology, the social structure of a particular technical field, and the
availability of benefits from innovation other than those obtained by selling
it.173
The fact that TRIPS fails to incorporate any standards of maximum IP
protection also reflects a paradigm of innovation in which follow-on
innovation is either unimportant or occurs within an industry structure in
which ex ante licensing is an effective means to structure it.174 Such an
assumption is inadequate even for traditional innovation, where a robust
public domain plays an important role in promoting innovation. Yet, it is
particularly detrimental for user and open and collaborative innovation, the
distributed and rapidly evolving nature of which undermines the potential
for ex ante licensing.
One response to concerns about the mismatch between the underlying
innovation paradigm embodied in TRIPS and alternative innovation
approaches is to point to TRIPS flexibilities. TRIPS itself bolsters the
argument for a generous view of its flexibilities in Articles 7 and 8 which
set out its Objectives and Principles, respectively. Article 7 specifies that:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.175
Article 8 states that:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be
needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by
right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably
173

See supra text accompanying notes 55–57.
See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 150, at 214 (arguing for user rights to be included in
international treaties); Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 21 (stating that TRIPS protects property holders rather
than users).
175
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7 (emphasis added).
174
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restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.176
As has been argued with respect to both access and the traditional IP
balance, Articles 7 and 8 provide a persuasive basis for interpreting TRIPS
flexibly so as to encourage and support evolving modes of innovation.177
In particular, Article 7 should be read as aspirational (rather than as an
affirmation that IP will fulfill these objectives) and its recognition that IP
“should contribute” to the goal of innovation understood as an
acknowledgment of the possibility of other mechanisms for promoting
innovation.178 Article 8’s statement that members may adopt measures “to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their . . .
technological development” also provides a possible handle for
accommodating alternative innovation approaches in the TRIPS context.179
Nonetheless, Article 8 permits the adoption of such measures only
when they are “consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”180 Since
the provisions of the Agreement are slanted toward a high protection
regime that does not provide any explicit accommodation for evolving
innovation paradigms, the question is whether the existing flexibilities are
sufficient to permit us to shoehorn new innovation models into what is at
bottom a mass market seller-based paradigm.
Certainly it would be possible to make significant progress.
Specifically, as argued by Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, and recognized in a recent overview of TRIPS patent exceptions,
there may be wiggle room in the interpretation of Article 27’s nondiscrimination requirement, allowing for differential treatment of various
industries as long as it reflects a legitimate purpose.181 However, it is not
clear that WTO panels will be inclined to interpret Article 27 with the
expansive degree of flexibility envisioned by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss.
176

Id. art. 8 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Barbosa et al., supra note 137, at 109–12 (“Articles 7 and 8 are, beyond any doubt,
interpretative tools with respect to the meaning of the TRIPS agreement.”); Chon, supra note 6, at
2829–30, 2835–36 (arguing generally for the use of TRIPS flexibilities in light of Articles 7 and 8 to
incorporate a “substantive equality” norm); Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without
Discriminating, supra note 9, at 447 (urging for “an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that . . .
offer[s] broad latitude to member states to implement their core TRIPS patent obligations”); Dreyfuss,
supra note 6, at 22–24 (explaining how under-developed countries can benefit from the aspirational
provisions—Articles 7 and 8—of the TRIPS Agreement); Garrison, supra note 157, at 22 (using Art. 7
TRIPS in part to analyze Art. 30 TRIPS); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND.
L.J. 827, 863–66 (2007) (describing, in the pharmaceutical context, the impact of TRIPS flexibility on
the policy and innovation of less developed countries).
178
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7.
179
Id. art. 8.
180
Id.
181
See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 449–50
(“[T]he language of the provision itself may contain latitude to create some level of differentiation.”);
Garrison, supra note 157, at 39 (showing the wiggle room in Article 27 by presenting two competing
interpretations of the same provision).
177
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One WTO panel, in a dispute involving an exception permitting use of a
patented invention during the patent term so as to facilitate regulatory
review, did interpret Article 27 so as to allow “bona fide exceptions to deal
with problems that may exist only in certain product areas.”182 This
statement leaves open the question of what makes an exception “bona
fide,” or, in Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s terms, gives it a legitimate
purpose.183 Particularly in light of Article 7, it would be a colorable
argument that a WTO dispute resolution body should deem legitimate a
purpose to promote innovation outside of the IP-based paradigm by, for
example, providing an exemption from patent infringement for open source
software.184 A considerable amount of ground work might be necessary to
make such an argument convincing, however. It seems likely that WTO
panels and the WTO appellate body will take a much narrower view of
Article 27’s anti-discrimination mandate unless they are given a road map
to a more innovation-friendly approach, a point to which I return in Part IV
of this Article.
With regard to exceptions to TRIPS patent minimum standards, the
agreement provides for “limited exceptions” and compulsory licensing
under Articles 30 and 31, respectively.185 Article 30 states that:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties.186
Beyond the exceptions permitted under Article 30, Article 31 provides
for ex ante compulsory licensing in certain fairly circumscribed situations.
Most importantly for present purposes, compulsory licensing is permitted
only on a case-by-case basis and only if “prior to such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not
been successful within a reasonable period of time.”187 Because of these
and other limitations, compulsory licensing under Article 31 is unlikely to
play an important role in making room for user innovation and open and
collaborative innovation; they do not lend themselves to such case-by-case
182
WORLD TRADE ORG., CANADA–PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS ¶
7.92, WT/DS114/R (2000) [hereinafter CANADA PHARMACEUTICALS].
183
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 452.
184
See Garrison, supra note 157, at 76 (mentioning the possibility of such an exemption in
passing).
185
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30–31.
186
Id. art. 30.
187
Id. art. 31.

2009]

INNOVATION PARADIGMS AND GLOBAL IP REGIME

899

and ex ante licensing, especially if a government procedure is required.
Accommodation to evolving modes of innovative activity under
TRIPS will thus have to pass muster under Article 30. The most important
interpretive questions for this purpose are probably the meanings of
“limited” and “unreasonably” in Article 30.188 These terms raise crucial
questions of baseline. Against what background standard should we
measure the magnitude or reasonableness of an exception? To make room
for alternative modes of innovation, such as user and open and
collaborative innovation, these terms would have to be interpreted in light
of the impact of an exception on innovation overall. This type of
interpretation would be a far cry from what we have seen so far. There has
been only one panel interpretation of Article 30, in the Canada
Pharmaceuticals dispute.189 As discussed in more detail by Dreyfuss190
and by Christopher Garrison,191 the panel interpretation construed the
requirement of a limited exception very stringently—based on the extent of
impairment of each of the patentee’s exclusive rights, counted individually,
and permitting only the most minor impairment of any of the rights.
Garrison argues that the panel’s interpretation is inconsistent with preexisting exemptions that were well accepted by TRIPS signatories and has
limited precedential value in light of the re-affirmation of the importance
of TRIPS objectives and principles after the Doha Declarations.192 The
reaffirmation of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS in the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, aimed primarily at issues of access to medicine, may provide
a hook for efforts to interpret TRIPS flexibilities expansively to account
for varying modes of innovation.193 The Declaration reaffirms the
importance of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS and emphasizes development
goals.
It is thus likely that the interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities in the
patent arena will evolve in light of ongoing concerns about the
international IP balance. Nonetheless, there is a long way to come from
the approach of the Canada Pharmaceuticals panel to the breadth of
flexibility necessary to accommodate evolving modes of innovation that
may optimally even replace intellectual-property-inspired innovation in
some arenas.
As an example, consider the possibility of exemptions for making and
use. TRIPS requires under Article 28 that patent infringement encompass
188

Id. art. 30.
CANADA PHARMACEUTICALS, supra note 182, at 18–21.
190
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 14–18.
191
Garrison, supra note 157, at 23–33.
192
Id. at 37, 41–42.
193
See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 7, at ¶ 19 (“[T]he TRIPS Council shall be guided
by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully
into account the development dimension.”).
189
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not only unauthorized sales of a patented invention but unauthorized use
and making of an invention.194 As I have detailed in earlier work,
exclusive rights to make and use may be counter-productive in some
arenas in which user innovation is highly effective. 195 Patent protection is
less important as an incentive for user innovation than it is for
manufacturer-centered research and development. Moreover, patent
licensing is likely to be a costly and ineffective means to coordinate user
innovation, which arises mostly not from pre-meditated research and
development, but as a side effect of use combined with “freedom to
tinker.” Thus, in some technologies, well-tailored use exemptions may be
the best way to promote user innovation. Because a use exemption would
promote certain kinds of innovation by users while decreasing incentives
for innovation by certain types of sellers (those whose business models
involve developing technology easily copied by users), the optimal menu
of use exemptions is likely to vary from place to place and from time to
time.
An optimal international innovation regime would leave room for
countries to adapt their use exemptions to their innovative strengths.
However, it is highly questionable whether use exemptions of this sort
would pass muster under Article 30 as either limited or reasonable. While
it is true that research exemptions and exemptions for personal and noncommercial use are relatively common among TRIPS signatories (and
hence presumably, though not definitely, acceptable under Article 30),196
those exemptions are generally premised on a lack of significant
commercial impact on patent holders. While the effects on innovation of a
broader use exemption might be salutary, such an exemption might very
well have significant commercial ramifications for individual patentees—
and hence not be deemed “limited” under Article 30. Article 30 reflects
the one-size-fits-all assumption that patenting is the best way to go to
promote innovation in every technology. It will be difficult to stretch it to
accommodate situations in which patent protection is simply not needed or
is counter-productive.
Even where there are colorable interpretations of TRIPS that might
permit a robust response to evolving innovation mechanisms, it seems
unlikely—as discussed more fully by Dreyfuss197 and in Part IV of this
194

TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 28.
See Strandburg, supra note 37, at 483–88, 531–41 (explaining the costs and benefits of patent
protection for user innovations and proposing a blanket exemption for research use of a patented
exemption or a “double-edged sword” exemption focusing on non-profit researchers); Strandburg,
supra note 53, at 267–68 (noting that “[P]atent exclusivity for business methods invented by users is
likely to impose particularly high social costs since user innovators are often motivated to restrict
dissemination of their inventions . . . .” and advocating a “business method use” exception).
196
See Garrison, supra note 157, at 44–49 (discussing pre-existing exceptions for non-commercial
use and for experimentation).
197
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 14–20.
195
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Article—that such interpretations will be forthcoming from WTO dispute
resolution unless an institution with innovation policy expertise lays the
analytic groundwork. Part IV argues that a WIPO exploration of evolving
innovation modes and their interaction with IP could lay the groundwork
for interpretation by WTO dispute resolution bodies and the TRIPS
Council.
C.

What TRIPS Leaves Out: The Increasing Importance of Private
Ordering

In addition to providing insufficient flexibility with respect to
minimum standards, TRIPS also simply does not deal with many issues
raised by user innovation and open and collaborative innovation because
they do not arise under the proprietary seller-oriented paradigm. In
particular, private ordering and institutional governance, ranging from
informal norms to complex licensing arrangements such as patent pools,
standards, and viral licensing, play critical and still under-theorized roles in
these newly important modes of innovation.198 IP law both constrains and,
in some cases, constructs these innovative models.
In retrospect, it is no surprise that those seeking to construct
collaborative and commons-like approaches in an innovation landscape
organized around the proprietary model will use both the IP regime itself
and other means of private ordering to structure their activities. Certainly
intermediate limited commons regimes are plentiful in the real property
context.199 Nonetheless, there are concerns about potential tensions
between these limited commons approaches and other normative concerns.
The construction of limited commons regimes is in some tension, for
example, with a commitment to the public domain as a resource for
innovation. It is very hard to know whether programmers would
participate in open source software projects without the guarantees
facilitated by the automatic copyrighting of their code or even whether the
copyright protection of source code produces more or less software
innovation on balance. Questions have also been raised as to whether
attempts to promote open innovation using the Creative Commons menu of
198
See generally Dinwoodie, The International IP System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, and
Private Ordering, supra note 12 (discussing “the increased role of national courts and private ordering
in developing international norms”); Dinwoodie, Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 167–69
(explaining the importance of private ordering in copyright law); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1393–96
(assessing the “normative sustainability” of private ordering of intellectual property in the global
regime); Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 376 (noting that private ordering is an “attractive option” for
remedying the rapid expansion of intellectual property rights but expressing concern that private
ordering relying on intellectual property rights may actually reinforce the property discourse as a
conceptual framework and a regulatory scheme for creative works); McJohn, supra note 12 at 66–68;
Rai, supra note 12, at 1439.
199
See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
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copyright licenses lead to more or less building upon the creative work of
others as compared to a regime in which registration is required to obtain
copyright protection or even a regime of benign neglect in which most
authors never bother to enforce their copyrights.200 Similar issues arise in
the context of university patenting and sharing of research tools within a
bounded academic community; a number of universities have recently
advocated licensing approaches that would create a limited commons
among university researchers by excluding commercial researchers (or at
least making them pay to use the tools).201 A number of “open biology”
projects use (or propose to use) contractually limited access to data to
construct a shared resource despite the fact database protection has been
adopted in some places, notably the EU, and not in others, notably the
United States.202 The conflict between the usefulness of strong IP in
constructing collaborative arrangements and its deleterious effects on the
public domain is also evident in debates over the protection of traditional
knowledge.203 Moreover, it is also surfacing in the debate about synthetic
biology, where some have even suggested extending copyright protection
to genomic sequences to facilitate a GPL-type approach.204 In general, the
desire to use IP to construct collaborative space can lead to controversial
attempts to increase propertization of the intellectual domain.205
The use of GPL-type licensing raises other normative questions as
200
See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 407–22 (outlining the limits of private ordering as
exemplified by Creative Commons in creating a governance regime for creative works).
201
See, e.g., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology
(March 6, 2007), available at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf
(“Universities should reserve the right to practice licensed inventions and to allow other non-profit and
governmental organizations to do so”); see also Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms, supra
note 65, at 43–44 (discussing means of establishing an academic research tool commons).
202
See, e.g., González, supra note 93, at 337–39, 346–50 (discussing the available strategies for
“open source” scientific databases).
203
See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 139, at 1032–34 (discussing and critiquing the move toward
propertization of traditional knowledge); Safrin, supra note 51, at 1921–22 (arguing “that the
establishment and the expansion of intellectual and other property rights have an internally generative
dynamic”); see also Chander & Sunder, supra note 123, at 1343–46 (pointing out the inequalities often
present in access to the non-propertized “public domain” and in the coverage of IP protection).
204
See, e.g., Rai & Boyle, supra note 96, at e58 & nn. 27–28 (discussing the difficulties in trying
to evoke copyright to create a synthetic biology commons).
205
See Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National
Courts, and Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 63 (noting “the entanglement of intellectual property
with trade and development”); Dinwoodie, Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 161 (noting the
balancing act between copyright law and public objectives); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1391
(“Intellectual property is a complex mix of different interests that either protects an intellectual creation
by an exclusive and proprietary right or guarantees some free access to, and use of, an intellectual
creation.”); Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 375 (“[M]any of the new opportunities that were made
possible by digital technology are increasingly enjoyed by the massive enclosure of the public domain
and the increasing commodification of information.”); Mann, supra note 12, at 2 (noting how
collaborative work and propertization are competing interests that are a byproduct of an open source
approach); McJohn, supra note 12, at 42–43 (reconciling an open source approach with a property
approach); Rai, supra note 12, at 1439–41; Safrin, supra note 51, at 1922 (introducing the “patent
paradox”).
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well. The open source software process works in part because the licenses
reach through in varying degrees to constrain and direct the way in which
licensees use the technology. Such constraints take on a very different
normative cast when proprietary firms impose them so as to control and
limit the ways in which users can engage in tinkering, modification,
reverse engineering, and sometimes even criticism of the products they
buy.206 Attempts to deploy open source approaches in realms such as
biology, where patents, which are expensive to obtain and of somewhat
indeterminate scope, are the IP of choice, raise further questions about
using such restrictions to construct a limited commons for collaborative
activity.207 For one thing, while there may be very little to constrain the
imposition of such use restrictions by contract, at least under United States
law,208 patent-based commons arrangements are vulnerable to claims of
exclusive rights by independent inventors and patent “trolls.” Copying is
neither a legal requirement for infringement nor a practical necessity.
Limitations on use imposed by notice alone are generally unenforceable
under the doctrine of patent exhaustion recently reaffirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.209 This doctrine complicates the formation of a patentbased open source project, but may be vitally important for user innovation
and personal use rights. Similar issues arise as a result of attempts to
facilitate “open source biology” that rely on controlling access to databases
using trade secrecy, contract, and technical protection measures.
In addition, the open source software process works in part because
licensing is standardized and automated. Use restrictions imposed by
manufacturers in online adhesion-type contracts are highly controversial,
206

See, e.g., van Houweling, supra note 123 (analogizing to the doctrine of servitudes for real
property to analyze modern intellectual property licensing practices) and references therein; Lemley,
supra note 127.
207
See generally Rai, supra note 39, at 131–33, 151–52 (noting the interplay between open and
collaborative projects and the biomedical research field); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1401–05
(discussing open-source patents in the biotechnological field); Feldman, supra note 125, at 117–20;
González, supra note 93, at 345 (explaining the difficulty in using open source licenses in a
commercially viable field like biotechnology); Henkel & Maurer, supra note 96, at 1–3 (laying out the
policy debate regarding an open source approach in the synthetic biology field); Kapczynski et al.,
supra note 85, at 1073; Kumar and Rai, supra note 39, at 1747–48 (“[S]ynthetic biology illustrates a
tension between different methods of creating ‘openness.’”); Maurer, supra note 93, at 405
(commenting on the challenging application of open source to difficult innovation problems such as
complex computer systems and drug discovery); Merges, supra note 112, at 186–87 (“[I]t is possible
for patents [in the biotechnology field] to create over-fragmentation in this area, and . . . wind up
deterring innovation instead of encouraging it.”); Opderbeck, supra note 125, at 171 (“Even if open
source models could work in biotechnology as a practical matter, one must ask the normative question
whether law and public policy should support such models . . . .”); Petherbridge, supra note 93, at 362–
63 (explaining how an open source approach differs in the life sciences context from other industries);
Rai, supra note 12, at 1442 (commenting that biotechnology may make drawing the boundaries of the
commons more difficult); Rai & Boyle, supra note 96, at e58 (“[S]ynthetic biology raises . . . an issue
[of] the tension between different methods of creating ‘openness.’”).
208
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 170 L. Ed. 2d 996, n. 7 (2008).
209
Id. at 1011.
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but “clickable” use restrictions would no doubt make it easier to extend the
GPL-type open source approach to patentable subject matter.
The enforceability of open source software licenses in jurisdictions
around the globe has barely been tested.210 Countries may well take
different views of these licensing practices and of attempts to extend them
to other technologies, raising questions about both the normative and legal
status of agreements used to create a supposed open and collaborative
innovation commons with global extent.
Thus, attempts by collaborative and nominally open projects to fence
off territory in which there is freedom to operate raise difficult and
important questions that leave a mass-market-based IP regime like TRIPS
both overly constraining and too narrowly focused to serve as the focal
point of global innovation policy. TRIPS does virtually nothing to regulate
private ordering through restrictive license provisions or to guarantee use
rights based on principles of exhaustion or first sale. Probably fortunately,
Article 6 specifically excludes the subject of exhaustion from the ambit of
TRIPS because of disagreements over how to treat exhaustion on the
international stage (though many bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements cabin
signatories’ ability to implement expansive international exhaustion
doctrines).211 Regulation of licensing practices is limited to a permissive
clause in Article 40 allowing members to “specify[] licensing practices or
conditions that may . . . hav[e] an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market.”212
Given its genesis, it is not surprising that TRIPS does not address these
issues. Until now, TRIPS silence in these arenas may have been a
blessing—facilitating the development of an open source regime of
software copyright licensing which takes the potential for strong reachthrough licensing and turns it into a mechanism for collaboration.
Nonetheless, the growing prevalence of user innovation and open and
collaborative innovation brings these issues of private ordering and its
210
See, e.g., Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing Open Source
and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 464–70 (2005) (discussing the private
enforcement of GPL’s and the beginning of minimal judicial enforcement); Dusollier, supra note 12, at
1420–25 (discussing the legal enforceability of open-source licensing); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K.
Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights
and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1209 (2006)
(discussing the enforceability of clickwrap licenses as contracts in court); Kumar, supra note 121, at
26, 27, 30 (discussing the interpretation of the GPL by a German District Court); Daniel B. Ravicher,
Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software
Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2000) (discussing the fact that only four courts have addressed the
issue of mass-market license enforceability); Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL
Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451, 453–54 (2005) (discussing the
enforceability of the GPL in court).
211
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 6; see also, Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing
Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1469, 1501–02 (2007) (discussing TRIPSPlus agreements and international exhaustion).
212
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 40.
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place in shaping the innovation environment to the fore. It may well be
that taking into account user and collaborative innovation and its
interaction with both the manufacture-innovator paradigm and the public
domain would call for broader-based regulation of private ordering or at
least for the promulgation of “best practices” or standards for licensing.213
The point here is not to propose substantive solutions to the problem of
creating a healthier global innovation policy regime and certainly not to
suggest that all of these aspects of global innovation practice should be
subject to international agreements or standards. On the contrary, the
continually evolving nature of innovation practice means that states need
flexibility to adapt their legal regimes to the innovative practices that are
most appropriate to a particular time and place.214 Just as it was a mistake
to enshrine an industrial manufacturer-based paradigm of innovation as an
international norm, it would be a mistake to make an inflexible
commitment to a particular collaborative paradigm. At the same time, one
must recognize the interests in predictability and lowering trade barriers in
a global innovation market. The trick is to balance the need for some
international consistency in a global economy with a diversity of
innovative paradigms.
IV. RE-IMAGINING WIPO: TOWARD AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH TO
A HEALTHIER GLOBAL INNOVATION REGIME
As noted above, there is a broader lesson in the rise of user and open
and collaborative innovation practices regarding the wisdom of freezing in
substantive requirements at the international level.
Innovation is
unpredictable in both its substance and its process. A rigidly locked-in
international IP regime, no matter how well tailored at its inception, is
unlikely to serve innovation well in the long term. What, then, is to be
done? There are no easy answers and there is much to learn about these
innovative paradigms and others which may emerge in the future as we
seek to determine the right balance of public domain, proprietary
“knowledge goods” and privately ordered, limited commons approaches.
Rather than consider possible substantive mechanisms in more detail,
this Part discusses possible institutional mechanisms, based on a global

213
See Dinwoodie, Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 162 (discussing recent examples of
(possible) international copyright norm formation); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1392 (discussing why
intellectual property regimes exist not only in the private domain, but are intertwined with the public
domain); Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 421 (suggesting that “creating an alternative to copyright
requires standardization”); McJohn, supra note 12, at 45 (discussing the public interest in private
ordering); Rai, supra note 12, at 1441.
214
One should, in fact, view this contention as an extension of the comparative advantage idea
underlying the original trade-based paradigm to the context of innovation. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss,
Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 456.
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215

administrative law approach,
to facilitate ongoing reform and
development of global innovation governance. Specifically, I propose reimagining WIPO and its relationship to TRIPS in light of a broader
approach to innovation policy. To this end, I will discuss four potential
roles for WIPO in moving toward a more satisfactory global innovation
policy regime.
At a minimum, WIPO should adopt an Innovation Policy Agenda (in
rough analogy to its recently adopted Development Agenda).216 A WIPO
Innovation Policy Agenda would provide a focal point for global discourse
and debate about continually evolving innovation approaches. Second,
perhaps as an outgrowth of an Innovation Policy Agenda, WIPO should
play a greater role in interpreting TRIPS flexibilities and examining
potential exceptions for TRIPS compliance. Third, and more ambitiously,
consideration should be given to the possibility of amending TRIPS to
provide for an exception authorization broader than is available under
Articles 27, 30, and 31, coupled with a more explicitly administrative role
for WIPO in vetting proposed exceptions. Finally, one might consider
expanding WIPO’s role to encompass consideration of international
standard-setting for activities, such as licensing, which are critical for
innovation yet not a matter of IP law per se. Any such initiatives would
need to balance harmonization with allowance for country-specific and
evolving innovation practices.
A. Why WIPO?
As Rochelle Dreyfuss points out persuasively, TRIPS suffers from a
law-making deficit because of the rarity and non-precedential character of
WTO panel decisions. 217 This law-making deficit is responsible at least in
part for the dearth of examples of states testing the limits of the flexibilities
currently available in TRIPS.218 The barriers to states adopting patent laws
that test the TRIPS flexibilities are many, including, in many developing
countries, the capacity and expertise to implement cutting-edge TRIPS
interpretations and the political, financial, and human capital resources to
risk challenges to those interpretations and to pursue disputes before the
WTO.219 This means that some other mechanism is needed to develop
215

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See DEVELOPMENT AGENDA documents, supra note 8; see also Halbert, supra note 13, at 255–
62, for an overview of the history of WIPO with particular attention to development issues.
217
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 1–3.
218
See Garrison, supra note 157, at 19–23 (detailing a study of patent infringement exceptions
globally demonstrating their limited scope); see also Ho, supra note 211, at 1495–99 (discussing the
effects of bilateral Free Trade Agreements on signatories’ flexibility).
219
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 25–27 (stating that implementing these laws requires either
that a country have experience with intellectual property protection or sufficient human capital, neither
of which developing countries have); Yu, supra note 6, at 387 (discussing some of the difficulties
developing countries face in implementing aggressive interpretations of TRIPS flexibilities).
216
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interpretations of TRIPS flexibilities that countries will be willing to adopt.
The WTO and the TRIPS Council are probably not the right places to
make progress on a broader understanding of innovation policy in the first
instance.220 Though they may be capable of implementing a more nuanced
approach to the TRIPS flexibilities (particularly with some input from
WIPO), an organization steeped in a trade mandate is unlikely to have
either the inclination or the expertise to make progress on a broader
innovation agenda.
In part because of its recent experience with the Development Agenda,
WIPO is probably best placed to provide a forum for dialogue about how
to use TRIPS flexibilities to accommodate broader innovation policy
concerns.221 This is the case despite complex questions, discussed at
length by Dreyfuss, about how exactly to incorporate the results of WIPO
deliberation into TRIPS interpretation under the WTO dispute settlement
process.222 WIPO has a standing committee structure for consideration of
IP-related issues, which has already been expanded to include a Committee
on Development and IP.223 Under the auspices of such committees and
otherwise, WIPO sponsors conferences, studies, and other forms of
discourse involving scholars, NGOs, stakeholders, and country
representatives. By these means, WIPO could conduct an ongoing analysis
of how to permit a variety of forms of innovative activity to flourish
together in a global governance framework.224
Of course, the relevance of innovation policy is not confined to any
single international organization. Indeed, discussion about open and
collaborative innovation is beginning in a variety of international forums.
For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) just released its “Information Economy Report 2007-2008,
Science and Technology for Development: the New Paradigm of ICT,”225
220
See Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 32–33 (discussing the shift from WIPO to the WTO). But see
Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 387, 435–38 (2000) (arguing in favor of an active role for the TRIPS Council as a primary
forum for TRIPS interpretations).
221
For an argument in favor of WIPO’s greater involvement in promoting TRIPS flexibilities see,
for example, Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 21–34. For general arguments in favor of WIPO taking a
greater role in promoting a more balanced approach to IP, see, for example, Geneva Declaration on the
Future of the World IP Organization, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/
futureofwipodeclaration.pdf (discussed in Halbert, supra note 13, at 273–76); James Boyle, A
Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of IP, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 10 (2004); Halbert, supra
note 13, at 283–84.
222
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26–29.
223
World Intellectual Property Organization, Committee on Development and Intellectual
Property, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/cdip/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
224
See Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 22, 42, discussing how WIPO and its predecessor
organizations have used such avenues to affect substantive global IP norms in the past.
225
UNCTAD, INFORMATION ECONOMY REPORT 2007–2008, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR
DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW PARADIGM OF ICT (2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
sdteecb20071_en.pdf.
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which recognizes that “ICT has also given rise to new models for sharing
knowledge and collective production of ideas and innovations,” known as
“open access” models, “which often bypass the incentive system provided
by [IP] rights”226 and notes that “[a]n innovation policy framework that
fully takes into consideration the changes generated by ICT must give
prominence to open approaches to innovation, which present significant
advantages for developing countries.”227 Promoting a dialogue on these
issues in a number of venues will ensure that a variety of perspectives are
included. Nonetheless it seems desirable to have a focal point organization
around which various stakeholders can coalesce and create coalitions of
participation in the debate. WIPO is a natural choice for this role in light
of its expertise in IP and its experience with the Development Agenda.
Indeed, while one may question WIPO’s capacity and willingness to
take a broader view of innovation policy in light of its high protectionist
history and IP-focused mandate, this is an opportune time for a re-focusing
of WIPO’s mission, given its weakened role in the global IP system after
TRIPs. WIPO’s efforts in undertaking the Development Agenda and its
activities in the arena of traditional knowledge demonstrate a growing
willingness and capacity to consider ramifications of IP outside of a
narrow manufacturer-based paradigm perhaps as part of a search to
preserve its relevance in a post-TRIPs world.228 Building an understanding
of and expertise in new and evolving innovation paradigms is within the
purview of WIPO in any event because of WIPO’s role in developing and
administering most IP agreements other than TRIPS.229 Crucially, WIPO
has been engaged for some time in attempts to develop a Substantive
Patent Law Treaty to harmonize further the international patent system.230
Such efforts clearly raise red flags in light of the problems already visible
in the substantive harmonization involved in TRIPS minimum standards
for patent law. It is very important to ensure that a broader innovation
policy perspective inform any discussions of further harmonization.
Though WIPO has clear institutional advantages as a focus for global
innovation policy setting, WIPO has a checkered history with respect to
open innovation. Its Convention sets its primary goal as to “promote the

226

Id. at 2.
Id. at 12.
228
One should not be too sanguine about this recent openness, of course. WIPO’s history is as an
organization devoted to the promotion of IP rights which has arguably been brought kicking and
screaming to its present openness to development issues. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 13, at 272–76
(discussing this history). Nonetheless, of the available institutions in the international IP regime,
WIPO seems the most likely to be both able and willing to pursue a broader innovation policy agenda.
229
For a list of WIPO-administered IP treaties, see World Intellectual Property Organization,
WIPO-Administered Treaties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
230
For a discussion of and critique of WIPO’s efforts in this regard, see Reichman & Dreyfuss,
supra note 20, at 122–29,
227

2009]

INNOVATION PARADIGMS AND GLOBAL IP REGIME
231

909

protection of [IP] throughout the world.” Moreover, in 2003, the United
States government, reportedly as a result of objections from Microsoft and
related corporate interests, pressured WIPO to rescind a plan to hold a
meeting on open source approaches.232 At that time Lois Boland, director
of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
reportedly said “that open-source software runs counter to the mission of
WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights” and that “[t]o hold
a meeting which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights seems
to us to be contrary to the goals of WIPO.”233
Times seem to be changing, though, as a result of efforts from NGOs
supportive of open source approaches along with WIPO’s adoption of the
Development Agenda. Though a specific reference to open source
software was removed from the approved version, the Development
Agenda proposals agreed upon in 2007 contain language that is consistent
with an important role for user and open and collaborative innovation in
development. The approved proposals include calls to “deepen the
analysis of the implications and benefits of a rich and accessible public
domain,” to “initiate discussions on how . . . to further facilitate access to
knowledge and technology . . . and to foster creativity and innovation[,]”
to “request WIPO to undertake . . . studies to assess the economic, social
and cultural impact of the use of intellectual property systems[,]” and to
“exchange experiences on open collaborative projects such as the Human
Genome Project as well as on intellectual property models.”234 These
proposals provide hooks for consideration of innovation paradigms beyond
the IP regime. Moreover, new paradigms for innovation cut across the
traditional divide between developing and developed countries, splitting
the perspectives of powerful developed country actors in new ways.
WIPO is also a good choice as a locus for a broader innovation policy
agenda because TRIPS itself contemplates the possibility that TRIPS
interpretation might be influenced by WIPO.
Thus, Article 68
contemplates that the TRIPS Council, in its activities in monitoring the
agreement, “may consult with and seek information from any source it
deems appropriate. In consultation with WIPO, the Council shall seek to
establish, within one year of its first meeting, appropriate arrangements for
cooperation with bodies of that Organization.”235 Though the metes and
bounds of cooperation set out in the subsequently-adopted formal
agreement between WIPO and the TRIPS Council are narrow and
primarily technical, the language of Article 68 certainly implies that the
231

Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
See Krim, supra note 15.
Id.
234
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 19, at *16, *19, *35, *36.
235
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 68.
232
233
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TRIPS Council may consult with WIPO more broadly.
Though the
current relationship between WIPO and TRIPS does not warrant explicit
deference to WIPO positions by WTO dispute resolution bodies,237 it
certainly places WIPO in a position to begin a dialogue over TRIPS
interpretation. As discussed in Section D of this Part, it might eventually
be advisable to amend TRIPS to provide WIPO with a more formal role in
TRIPS interpretation.
B. An Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO
An important step toward incorporating consideration of evolving
innovation paradigms in the global debate about IP law would be for
WIPO to develop and adopt an Innovation Policy Agenda, along the lines
of the recently-adopted Development Agenda. This adoption would take a
wide view of promoting innovation in the long term and avoid the
inaccurate perception that open and collaborative innovation is necessarily
averse to business interests. Under the auspices of an Innovation Policy
Agenda, WIPO could provide a forum for vetting interpretations of TRIPS
flexibilities and proposals for national legislation to accommodate a
broader approach to innovation. WIPO could also consider a range of
issues beyond IP per se related to user innovation and open and
collaborative innovation.
Very recently, WIPO has begun to take steps toward recognizing the
importance of open and collaborative innovation. For example, a report
prepared for the June 2008 meeting of the WIPO Standing Committee on
Patents included sections on licensing, patent pools, collaborative research
projects (including open source) and a discussion of potential problems
caused by patent thickets.238 A list of “issues for further elaboration and
discussion” approved at that meeting includes “alternative models for
innovation,” “limitations to the rights,” and “research exemption.”239 At
the July 2008 meeting of the WIPO Committee on Development and IP,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation presented a statement in which it
suggested that “WIPO could also provide Member States with information
about the benefits for education and scientific research of Open Innovation
and User Driven Innovation models” and that these “new theories of
innovation . . . have the potential to radically reshape collaboration and

236
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1995), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/pdf/
trtdocs_wo030.pdf; see also Nichols, supra note 166 at 1420–22, summarizing the current relationship
between the WTO and WIPO.
237
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26.
238
See generally REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 17.
239
SUMMARY BY THE CHAIR, supra note 17, at 2, 4.
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240

innovation in the developing world.”
All of these recent activities lay
groundwork for a more formal WIPO Innovation Policy Agenda.
The development of an Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO would
provide a focal point for various stakeholders with interests in user
innovation and open and collaborative innovation, along with others, such
as information technology firms that object to the TRIPS one-size-fits-all
approach. The political economy already makes it likely that TRIPS
“flexibilities” will come to be more widely deployed in recognition of the
needs of the information technology industry with its complex cumulative
innovation. Participants in user and open and collaborative innovation, and
those NGOs that support these approaches, should make use of the
networks of connections which link them to information technology sector
stakeholders.241 There are great advantages to such an approach because of
the global network of participants already involved in many user and open
and collaborative innovation projects; the extent to which the networks of
participants interpenetrate the networks of commercial stakeholders who
will be involved in the debate; and the extent to which commercial
stakeholders are increasingly dependent on the open source community for
aspects of their businesses.242
An Innovation Policy Agenda would provide a point of coalescence for
these parties to mobilize their resources, to create, to deploy, and to link
nodes so as to affect the process of “nodal governance” that will no doubt
be involved in the adaptation of TRIPS to the needs of the information
technology sector.243 Over time, these adaptations are likely to be made
both directly, by influencing the development of interpretative machinery
at WIPO or the WTO, and indirectly, by influencing the evolution of
domestic IP law, which will in turn influence the interpretation of TRIPS.
Participants in and advocates of open and collaborative innovation can
also seek to use their networks of connections to influence the increasingly
successful attempt to account for development concerns in the global IP
regime. Already, many developing countries view the use of open source
software as a beneficial path.244 Advocates for user innovation and open
240
EFF Statement at WIPO Development Agenda Meeting–CDIP2, Second Session, July 7–11,
2008, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2008-July/003378.html.
241
See, e.g., O’Mahony & Bechky, supra note 122 (discussing the important interactions between
information technology companies and the open source community).
242
See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 5, at 122–27 (discussing how social production is altering the
business environment and the relationships between firms and individuals); WEBER, supra note 37, at
190–207 (examining business models and experiments in open source); Stephen R. Walli, Under the
Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0, at 121, 127–35
(DiBona, Cooper & Stone eds., 2006) (explaining how businesses can use open source software as a
tool to obtain a competitive advantage); O’Mahony & Bechky, supra note 122.
243
See Burris et al., supra note 11, at 52–53 (making a similar proposal in the context of the
debate over public health and access).
244
See Câmara & Fonseca, supra note 130, at 129–30 (assessing how open source software can be
promoted effectively in developing countries to help them meet their development goals); Gupta, supra
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and collaborative innovation should deploy their networks of contacts in
developing countries and in organizations serving developing countries to
articulate the role that these forms of innovation play and could play in
development.245 There is already progress in this direction with the
proposal for exploration of “open collaborative projects” in the WIPO
Development Agenda246 and the recent discussions of open innovation
approaches in the WIPO Committee on Development and IP. A WIPO
Innovation Policy Agenda would facilitate this involvement.
C. A Notice and Comment Approach to WIPO Interpretations of TRIPS
Flexibilities
Particularly as WIPO develops broader innovation policy expertise
pursuant to an Innovation Policy Agenda or otherwise, it might begin to
play a more important role in interpreting TRIPS flexibilities and analyzing
whether possible exceptions comply with TRIPS. As Dreyfuss argues, the
WTO Dispute Settlement process is a poor mechanism to provide
authoritative interpretations of amorphous terms in the agreement that
might be interpreted so as to provide some flexibility, such as “limited,”
“normal exploitation,” without “unreasonable prejudice” and so forth.247
This is in part because dispute settlement proceedings are rare and in part
because the panels are unqualified to make innovation policy. Dreyfuss
argues that an administrative mechanism is needed to give content to these
terms in light of the purposes of IP in general and of the purposive
statements incorporated in TRIPS itself.248 She then suggests ways in
which the existing IP administrative bodies—primarily WIPO and the
TRIPS Council—might undertake such an interpretive task so as to take
advantage of WIPO’s expertise in IP policy.249
My proposal here piggybacks off of her suggestions. Consideration of
evolving alternative mechanisms for innovation only reinforces the need
for an administrative approach. The infrequent forays into TRIPS
interpretation of WTO dispute resolution bodies are a completely
ineffective mechanism for considering and vetting TRIPS exceptions under
Article 30 once one moves away from the mass market seller innovator
paradigm, which seeks to minimize exceptions to rigorous enforcement of
note 73, at 63–64 (describing the success of the Honey Bee Network, which has documented over
10,000 innovations and examples of indigenous knowledge); Lee, supra note 130, at 68 (explaining
how developing countries can benefit from the cost savings of open source software); Olejko, supra
note 130, at 875–81 (discussing steps developing countries can follow to utilize open source software);
Weber, supra note 130, at 16–17, 20 (discussing the benefits that open source software can bring to
developing countries).
245
E.g., Douthwaite et al., supra note 73, at 820–21; Gupta, supra note 73, at 50–51.
246
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 19, at para. *16, *17, *23, *27, *35, *36, *45.
247
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 13–18.
248
Id. at 18–19.
249
Id. at 19–31.
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patent protection. If TRIPS flexibilities are to play a positive role in
promoting innovation and ensuring that the IP paradigm does not crowd
out other innovation models, then it is critical to have an ongoing
discussion not only of whether proposed exceptions would pass muster
under TRIPS but also of which exceptions make sense as a matter of
innovation policy under a variety of circumstances. Under a broader view
of the goal of TRIPS as promoting innovation (rather than IP protection per
se), exceptions should not only be tolerated but should be promoted under
certain circumstances.
WIPO is well-placed to provide a forum for analyzing exceptions that
might potentially be implemented in national legislation. A well-reasoned
WIPO analysis would provide persuasive evidence to WTO bodies of how
a large number of member states view the TRIPS provisions and also of
the views of an organization with expertise in the area of innovation
policy.
If WIPO begins to take a greater role in TRIPS interpretation, it will be
important to deal with traditional administrative issues of transparency,
legitimacy, and voice.250 WIPO consideration of potential exceptions
should incorporate the views not only of IP stakeholders, developing
countries, and potential consumers of new inventions, but also of
participants in and advocates for less traditional innovative practices,
including the user innovation and open and collaborative innovation
discussed in earlier parts of this Article. Historically, WIPO has been very
unwilling to permit participation from diverse constituencies.251 However,
its experience with the Development Agenda and, as Debora J. Halbert
argues, with the issue of traditional knowledge appears to be opening it up
to more expansive participation.252
Openness to input from innovators will be critical to the success of an
Innovation Policy Agenda. Once one acknowledges the importance of new
and evolving models of innovation, it becomes essential to combine the IP
and innovation policy expertise of an organization like the re-imagined
WIPO with a means of tapping into the global innovation grassroots. An
250
For general discussions of these issues in the global context, see, for example, Burris et al.,
supra note 11, at 54–57 (discussing administrative issues in seeking to use nodal forms of governance);
Cassese, Global Standards, supra note 11, at 112–13 (discussing the emergence of global rules
addressed to states and how the two interact); Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra
note 11, at 694 (discussing the procedural issues that must be dealt with in the global context to ensure
the protection of individuals and organizations); Esty, supra note 11, at 1537–42 (stating the challenges
that arise in the international context for administrative law); Kingsbury et al., supra note 11, at 37–39
(discussing procedural participation and transparency in global administrative law); Slaughter &
Zaring, supra note 11, at 224–25 (discussing transgovernmental networks and their potential to
facilitate cooperation on the international level); Stewart, supra note 11, at 69–73 (discussing the issues
of control, accountability, participation and responsiveness regarding domestic and global
administrative law).
251
Halbert, supra note 13, at 271–76.
252
Id. at 271–80.
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ear to the ground complements IP expertise in informing a flexible and
responsive global system.
With this in mind, WIPO should open up its deliberations on a regular
basis to representatives of those involved in user innovation and open and
collaborative innovation, as it is doing with indigenous communities in its
deliberations regarding traditional knowledge.253 Beyond a more inclusive
approach to NGOs, WIPO should consider adopting an accessible and
open “notice-and-comment” approach to potential TRIPS exceptions.254
The same Internet technology which is responsible for the recent surge in
new innovative practices provides a mechanism for implementing a truly
global notice and comment procedure.255 WIPO conceivably could set up
an online forum for proposing and discussing TRIPS exceptions.256
Interested parties, including states, industry actors, NGOs, and even
individuals could submit comments about specific proposals for
exceptions, interpretations of the TRIPS non-discrimination requirement,
and so forth. To draw out serious and well thought proposals, each
proposal might be required to include an “innovation impact
assessment”—arguments as to why the proposed exception or
interpretation would promote innovation. Online rating or tagging systems
could also be used to weed out spurious proposals and comments or to
group similar comments.257
An open notice and comment procedure would provide a means to
solicit a variety of perspectives which could inform WIPO and give it
access to the distributed expertise about innovation which is present at the
global grassroots. An open process of notice and comment might go far to
alleviate the legitimacy problems with WTO reliance on WIPO
interpretations raised by Dreyfuss.258 TRIPS provides that the TRIPS
Council “may consult with and seek information from any source it deems
appropriate” in conjunction with its monitoring responsibilities.259 The
more transparently vetted WIPO interpretations of TRIPS are, the more
appropriate it would seem to be to rely on them.
Of course, as discussed in Part III, there are limits to the extent to
253

Id. at 276–80.
See Kingsbury et al., supra note 11, at 35 (discussing the relatively new phenomenon of
adoption of notice and comment procedures by international bodies).
255
Of course, not all members of constituencies importantly affected by innovation policy would
have direct access to such an online forum. However, as internet access is becoming more and more
widespread, civil society NGOs would certainly have access, and, in any event, any procedure using the
Internet to permit direct involvement by citizens worldwide in commenting on innovation policy would
be vastly more inclusive than anything going on at WIPO presently.
256
This proposal is reminiscent of Noveck’s “Peer to Patent” approach to examination being
tested at the USPTO, Noveck, Peer to Patent, supra note 35, at 143–51, or of Cynthia Ho’s proposal
for a response to biopiracy and patent bioethics issues, Ho, supra note 35, at 532–40.
257
E.g., Noveck, Peer to Patent, supra note 35, at 147–49.
258
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26.
259
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 68.
254
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which the provisions of TRIPS—which were meant to cabin patentability
exceptions—can be stretched to accommodate the needs of a changing
innovation regime.260 The advantages of having ongoing input and
proposals for how states might implement the TRIPS flexibilities in light
of an evolving innovation environment would extend beyond providing
more informed and well-thought-out interpretations of the current
provisions of TRIPS. Proposals rejected in the TRIPS/WIPO interpretive
process that were accompanied by persuasive innovation impact
assessments would generate suggestions and support for possible
amendments to TRIPS in light of changing technology and practice.
For example, as discussed in Part III, there may be circumstances in
particular technological fields which would make a relatively broad
exception to the exclusive right to use an invention socially beneficial even
where it might not be sufficiently limited to comply with Article 30.261 An
open interpretive forum would provide advocates of user innovation with
an opportunity to make the case for amending TRIPS to permit use
exemptions to nurture this innovative practice.
The availability of such a global forum for discussion and evaluation
of proposed TRIPS exceptions and flexibilities would also feed debates
about exceptions at the national level, likely helping to give political
legitimacy to advocates of more flexible national IP regimes.
D. Amending TRIPS to Give WIPO an Administrative Role
While the adoption of an Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO and the
establishment of a WIPO forum for vetting TRIPS flexibilities would be
steps in the right direction, such an ad hoc approach to TRIPS flexibilities
may not be enough to make positive room for evolving innovation
practices. Because of the complexity and continuing evolution of the
innovation environment, it is hard to escape the conclusion that this is an
arena in which a more explicitly administrative regime is needed at the
global level.262
Here I propose a more far-reaching change than could be accomplished
simply by having WTO dispute resolution bodies take WIPO analysis into
account informally in evaluating TRIPS exceptions. The proposal would
be to amend the TRIPS agreement to shift more of the burden for assessing
260
See supra Part III.A (discussing the limitation of TRIPS for accommodating evolving forms of
innovation).
261
See supra text accompanying notes 193–94.
262
As Dreyfuss notes, the general framework of WTO reliance on expert international
organizations to provide standards is not new. Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26. She also notes,
however, that such an approach might be risky at the moment since WIPO’s institutional identity is in a
period of upheaval. Id. at 28. Most likely a change of the sort I advocate here would have to follow a
period of experience with more informal input from WIPO under the auspices of an Innovation Policy
Agenda.
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the innovative benefits of TRIPS exemptions or of differential treatment of
different technologies to an explicitly recognized administrative process,
which would not require the very difficult step of treaty amendment every
time the innovative process evolves.263 To accomplish this, a general
provision permitting exceptions “reasonably intended to promote
innovation and not to restrain trade” would be substituted for Article 30.264
The amendment should also clarify that Articles 27 and 28 are subject to
such exceptions. As an expert innovation policy agency, WIPO would be
given the formal responsibility for vetting exceptions to see whether they
are “reasonably intended to promote innovation and not to restrain
trade.”265 WTO dispute resolution would then defer, at least to some
degree, to WIPO’s evaluations.
Contemplating a more formal role for WIPO in evaluating TRIPS
flexibilities raises at least two important issues. First, there is the question
of the extent of deference WTO dispute resolution bodies should give to
WIPO interpretations of the proposed “reasonably intended to promote
innovation and not to restrain trade” requirement.266 Rather than give even
a re-imagined WIPO final authority over the validity of TRIPS exceptions,
there are several reasons to prefer an intermediate level of deference.
While a re-imagined WIPO would have a broad mandate, including,
importantly, the current Development Agenda, there are a number of other
international organizations with portfolios that touch on innovation policy.
It would be reasonable to permit parties involved in dispute resolution
proceedings to bring arguments against WIPO’s interpretations based on
the views of organizations with expertise in areas other than innovation
that are related to a particular dispute. Indeed, as noted by Dreyfuss, the
WTO itself has a trade agenda which will not always align with the
promotion of innovation.267 It is only reasonable to leave room for WTO
263
See Okediji, supra note 14, discussing the potential for WIPO to play the role of an expert
agency. Okediji concludes that the WTO is the more appropriate forum for IP norm-setting in the final
instance. The proposals here are not necessarily inconsistent with WTO dominance in final
decisionmaking. The important point is that WIPO is well placed to formulate and vet innovation
policy proposals even through final decisionmaking power undoubtedly will be vested in the WTO
because of its enforcement powers.
264
Here I address only the patent provisions of TRIPS. Similar changes to the other sections of
TRIPS should also be considered.
265
WIPO itself would have to be restructured to implement such a formal vetting process, an
issue which I do not deal with here.
266
Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have recently considered a similar issue in connection with their
proposal for an Innovation Policy Agency in the United States. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai,
Innovation and Its Reform: A Regulatory Perspective, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
They propose an Innovation Policy Agency with a mandate to review regulations proposed by other
executive agencies in light of their effects on innovation policy. They argue that the Innovation Policy
Agency should have the power to send a proposed regulation back for further review, but that the
agency with substantive authority in a particular area should have the power to enact the regulation
over IPA remand.
267
Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 28.
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dispute resolution panels to take specifically trade-focused rationales into
account.
Second, there are good reasons, particularly in the international context
(where the legitimacy of an administrative approach may be questioned) to
avoid focusing too much power in one particular international actor
(indeed, this is part of the problem with the current configuration of
TRIPS). Giving more responsibility for interpreting TRIPS to a reimagined WIPO raises reasonable concerns about agency capture by
powerful developed country interests. These concerns are mitigated
somewhat in the context of new paradigms of innovation (in contrast to the
situation with respect to the Development Agenda, for example) because,
as we have seen in the past few years in the disputes between the
pharmaceutical industry and much of the information technology industry,
the evolution of innovation paradigms can set even powerful developed
country interests at odds with one another. Nonetheless, it would be best
to avoid concentrating too much power over innovation policy in any one
organization so as to avoid creating an overly attractive target for capture.
Dividing power facilitates the ability for weaker players to have influence
through nodal governance and regime shifting.
There is thus a need to balance the advantages of innovation policy
expertise and a reliable institutional framework for vetting proposed
exceptions against the disadvantages of concentrated power.
An
intermediate level of deference, in which WTO dispute resolution panels
are required to articulate specific reasons for rejecting any exception which
has survived WIPO’s vetting procedure, might be appropriate. If a panel
were to reject WIPO’s determination as to whether a particular exception
promotes innovation, the WTO Appellate Body would be empowered to
reweigh the WIPO analysis against the panel’s reasoning.
WIPO evaluation of proposed exceptions would provide states with a
degree of certainty in enacting them even if the dispute resolution
procedure retained its role as the finally binding interpreter. Because
formal disputes under the WTO are rare, and because WIPO’s analysis
would be ongoing, WIPO’s interpretations would likely be very influential.
This would be particularly true if WIPO evaluations paved the way for
broad adoption of exceptions by states, which might then constitute
“subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” under Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention and hence inform subsequent interpretations.268
E. International Governance and Private Ordering of Innovation
A final role for a re-imagined WIPO under an Innovation Policy
Agenda would be as an incubator of potential international initiatives
268

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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related to the ways in which innovation is structured and governed by
licensing law, competition law, and so forth. Such initiatives might range
from offering model licensing regimes, to promulgating best practices and
standards, to suggesting model national legislation concerning the
governance of innovative collaborations (including, for example, patent
pools and other limited commons constructions), through to proposing new
international agreements about such issues as reach-through licensing.
Of course, existing open and collaborative projects have already
wrestled with the question of how to employ IP and licensing in
cooperation with formal or informal organizational structure to provide a
productive and sustainable innovation process. They have also dealt with
procedural issues raised by the need for decision-making within an often
widely-dispersed and self-selecting group. Most significant open source
software projects, for example, have well-defined governance structures,
usually vesting decision-making authority, at least with respect to what
goes into the official version of the program, in those who started the
project or have demonstrated technical skill.269
The success of open source software is also attributable to the
development of a standardized “platform” of legal technology to define
and govern the resulting limited commons.270 This legal apparatus
supervises the activities of a transnational network of private actors
(primarily the technologists who actually develop the software) and also
serves to mediate between the collaborative enterprise and the rest of
society. The legal apparatus consists of a family of IP licenses, based on
specific principles, which govern both the iterative development of the
software and its potential uses.271
Over time, the open source software community has also developed
governance institutions, including primarily the activities of the Open
These
Source Initiative272 and the Free Software Foundation.273
organizations certify licenses in accordance with agreed-upon principles,
which differ somewhat. The Free Software Foundation maintains the
widely used copyleft GPL license, while the Open Source Initiative has
certified a number of different licenses,274 and maintains trademark
protection for the “Open Source Initiative Approved” moniker and for the
initiative’s symbol. Both organizations also engage in broader policy and
269
See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37, at 88–89, 166–71, 186–89; Steven Weber, Patterns of
Governance in Open Source, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0, at 361–72 (DiBona, Cooper & Stone eds., 2006).
270
See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37, at 179–85 (discussing the role of open source licenses as de
facto constitutions).
271
Id. at 180.
272
Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
273
Free Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
274
See, e.g., Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1398–1400 (discussing the “schism” between Free
Software Foundation and Open Source Initiative).
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advocacy activities.
These organizations, though non-governmental, provide models of
governance of a widely dispersed and transnational community of
developers and users. Perhaps even more than governments, they are
sensitive to concerns of legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents, since
the option of exit (known in the open source world as “forking”) is much
more easily exercised in cyberspace. These legitimacy concerns have
given rise to procedures reminiscent of typical administrative law.275 For
example, the most recent release of the GPL copyleft license raised a great
deal of controversy.276 In an effort to manage this controversy, Richard
Stallman, whose Free Software Foundation “blesses” the license, held an
eighteen-month period of what was essentially public “notice and
comment” rulemaking before releasing the finalized version.277
While these governance mechanisms have been highly successful and
may remain adequate, as these modes of innovation take on increasing
economic and social importance, it also becomes more important to
manage the boundaries between these projects and both the proprietary
world and the public domain. It is not necessarily clear that the
technologists involved in the governance of open and collaborative
projects will be sensitive to the possible external impacts of their practices.
As legal and organizational models for open and collaborative innovation
proliferate, it may become more important to have broader public input
into the forms they take. Since many of these collaborations are
quintessentially transnational, these governance issues are unavoidably
global despite their roots in local contract and licensing law.
It is thus possible that international bodies such as WIPO will be called
upon to play a role in helping to shape the landscape in which this private
ordering takes place so that the governance of user innovation and open
and collaboration innovation takes into account broader public values. The
same kinds of issues concerning the balance between harmonization and
international diversity that arise in considering TRIPS exceptions are likely
to arise in the governance of the products of open and collaborative
innovation processes as well. A re-imagined WIPO focused on broadbased consideration of innovation policy would be alert to these issues.

275
Indeed, these procedures are to some extent a model and proof of concept for the Internetenabled global notice and comment procedure proposed above.
276
E.g., Charles Babcock, The Controversy Over GPL 3, INFO. WEEK (Mar. 17, 2007), available
at http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/linux/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=198001444&
pgno=1&queryText=&isPrev=.
277
See Free Software Foundation, http://gplv3.fsf.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2008), for press
releases and archives of the process for debating the revised license.
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V. CONCLUSION
We stand at what is probably only the beginning of a flowering of new
and emergent innovation practices facilitated by developments in
communication technology. Yet, we confront these evolving practices
with a rigid and outdated international innovation policy regime. The main
message of this Article is that it is high time to consider seriously both how
to accommodate the user innovation and open and collaborative innovation
practices that are already with us, and how to avoid repeating the mistake
of institutionalizing any particular approach to innovation in a difficult-tochange international instrument. In doing so, we must also meet the need
for sufficient harmonization to allow us to reap the benefits of globally
distributed and diverse innovative practices.
In this Article, I suggest that we seek to deploy an administrative-type
approach to cope with emerging innovation paradigms. To that end, I
propose that WIPO be re-imagined as a broad-based innovation policy
organization, at a minimum through the development and adoption of an
Innovation Policy Agenda, and perhaps eventually through amendment of
TRIPS to permit WIPO to serve as an interpretive “agency” under a more
formal administrative approach to IP law exceptions. I also suggest that
WIPO provide a forum for considering issues of licensing and competition
law raised by the governance of collaborative innovation projects and their
boundaries with proprietary models on the one hand and the public domain
on the other. Primarily, this Article seeks to encourage an expanded
dialogue in global innovation policy which takes into account emerging
innovation paradigms.

